



Thinking Like Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an 
“Attitude of Suspended Conclusion” Lost on Lawyers? 
Donald J. Kochan∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his 1910 book, How We Think,1 John Dewey proclaimed, “[T]he 
most important factor in the training of good mental habits consists in 
acquiring the attitude of suspended conclusion.”2 This Article comes at 
an opportune time, just after the centennial anniversary of that book, to 
reflect on its insights, explore that proclamation, and describe its mean-
ing and significance in the enterprise of thinking generally and its impor-
tance in lawyering particularly.3 This Article briefly begins by comment-
ing on Dewey’s larger corpus of work, especially his work on logic and 
legal reasoning. It will then highlight the importance of the attitude of 
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 1. JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK (1910) [hereinafter DEWEY]. Dewey published what amounts 
to a revised (rather than a second) edition in 1933. JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK: A RESTATEMENT 
OF THE RELATION OF REFLECTIVE THINKING TO THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS iii (rev. ed. 1933) [here-
inafter DEWEY 1933]. Although the 1933 edition includes some interesting and important changes to 
the overall text, such changes in large part are immaterial to the general lessons from the original 
publication discussed in this Article. See B.H. Bode, Book Review, 13 EDUC. RES. BULL. 210, 210 
(1934) (stating that the “basic point of view and the general approach remain unchanged” in the 
1933 revision). It will be used only when helpful in providing additional clarity on the subjects in-
volved herein. 
 2. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 13. 
 3. According to Dewey, “[How We Think] was written for pedagogical purposes rather than for 
strictly logical ends.” John Dewey, An Analysis of Reflective Thought, 19 J. PHIL. 29, 29 (1922) 
[hereinafter Dewey, Reflective Thought]. 
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suspended conclusion to thinking and the importance of training and in-
stilling the attitude. This Article examines competing habits of mind and 
covers methods to overcome them. This Article then argues for the im-
portance of the attitude of suspended conclusion for legal thought and 
ends with a short conclusion on the importance of adopting a disciplined 
attitude of suspended conclusion generally. 
This Article examines a foundational concept in the study of 
thought that was presented in How We Think: the attitude of suspended 
conclusion. If we think about the phrase “suspended conclusion” and 
break it into its component parts, we can see that (1) it does not foreclose 
an ultimate conclusion; (2) it simply requires suspension before conclu-
sion; and (3) it means that there must be some prerequisite act—
thinking—before conclusion and after suspension. When one adopts an 
attitude of suspended conclusion, one avoids being conclusory. One em-
braces doubt, accepts confusion and anxiety, examines alternative sug-
gestions, overcomes impatience and habitual tendencies to rush toward 
an answer, and otherwise avoids the impulsive tendencies toward a pre-
mature conclusion. 
This concept has seldom been discussed in the literature on legal 
education.4 In essence, it is an admonition that individuals should think 
like thinkers—they should dedicate themselves to the task of reflective 
thought. Dewey’s exposition on reflective thought presents the starting 
point for analysis of the suspended conclusion concept. Dewey explains: 
In some cases, a belief is accepted with slight or almost no attempt 
to state the grounds that support it. In other cases, the ground or ba-
sis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the 
belief examined. This process is called reflective thought; it alone is 
truly educative in value, and it forms, accordingly, the principal 
subject of this volume.5 
                                                 
 4. Dewey’s attitude of suspended conclusion has clearly been under covered in the literature. 
Searches in JSTOR and Westlaw discover the phrase suspended conclusion (or references to its 
specific use in Dewey’s work) in fewer than twenty academic articles, and even then, the treatment 
is minimal. In fact, the general field of alternative argumentation that suspended conclusion antic-
ipates is under covered. Cf. Lisa T. McElroy & Christine N. Coughlin, The Other Side of the Story: 
Using Graphic Organizers to Counter the Counter-Analysis Quandary, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 227, 
227 (2010) (“Very little has been written about the construction and cognition of legal counter-
analysis.”). Perhaps this lack of recognition is evidence of social psychologist Gustav Ichheiser’s 
general observation that “[n]othing evades our attention so persistently as that which is taken for 
granted.” GUSTAV ICHHEISER, APPEARANCES AND REALITIES: MISUNDERSTANDING IN HUMAN 
RELATIONS 8 (1970). For curious readers, Ichheiser’s work on attribution theory and on personology 
is analyzed in, for example, Floyd Webster Rudmin et al., Gustav Ichheiser in the History of Social 
Psychology: An Early Phenomenology of Social Attribution, 26 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 165 (1987). 
 5. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 1–2. Dewey states it more concisely in the 1933 edition: 
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Dewey then posits as his leading premise in How We Think that the 
mind must learn to suspend conclusion—to suspend judgment—at the 
outset of any approach to a problem that presents itself to the mind for 
thought. 
The critical paragraph from How We Think for the purposes of the 
remaining discussion in this Article explains the pivotal importance of 
the suspended conclusion concept or rule for reflective thinking: 
Reflective thinking, in short, means judgment suspended during fur-
ther inquiry; and suspense is likely to be somewhat painful. As we 
shall see later, the most important factor in the training of good 
mental habits consists in acquiring the attitude of suspended conclu-
sion, and in mastering the various methods of searching for new 
materials to corroborate or to refute the first suggestions that occur. 
To maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and pro-
tracted inquiry—these are the essentials of thinking.6 
This insight can become a powerful tool if implemented in a disciplined 
approach to the thinking process. 
One attains the attitude of suspended conclusion when developing 
an art and discipline that quells the jittery impulse for the fix of a conclu-
sion, that accepts an operative state of doubt, and that maintains the pa-
tience for careful and thorough inquiry before reaching an eventual con-
clusion. The thinker must approach every problem with an open mind 
and without a predetermined conclusion. The thinker must overcome the 
anxiety associated with suspense. A conclusion is the end of a reflective 
process, not an end in and of itself. 
Perhaps this guidance is so obvious that it seems not to deserve this 
level of attention—the dedication of study to something so seemingly 
prosaic. I contend that there is new light to be gleaned from what other-
wise seems ordinary. My challenge to the reader is to consider the fol-
lowing claim: this lesson indeed deserves such attention precisely be-
cause it is so obvious but too often ignored as to make its study intellec-
tual.7 A discipline of following the rule of suspended conclusion can act 
                                                                                                             
[R]eflective thinking, in distinction from other operations to which we apply the name of 
thought, involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which 
thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that 
will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity. 
DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 12. 
 6. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 13. 
 7. Drawing again from Ichheiser: “[T]he contention that certain facts are ‘quite obvious’ must 
be considered not only as meaningless but even far worse than that: as a device for blocking the 
analysis of basic phenomena and preventing the incorporation of these phenomena into a theory of 
human relations.” ICHHEISER, supra note 4, at 11. With that in mind, I aspire in this Article to meet a 
standard of Alfred Whitehead, the well-regarded philosopher and mathematician: “Familiar things 
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like a trigger lock for the mind, disabling the tendency to “shoot first and 
ask questions later.”8 The rule of suspended conclusion must be engaged 
before firing the synapses of thought. 
The potent suspended conclusion concept encompasses much of 
what a lawyer or student of law needs to know to properly and fully eva-
luate a legal problem. As such, this Article is written largely with the 
lawyer in mind, but the full discussion of the concept has implications 
for thinkers of all types. 
Lawyers face a unique problem in their thinking in the form of de-
bilitating tendencies specific to law that prevent them from adopting the 
attitude of suspended conclusion. The very nature of a lawyer’s profes-
sional obligations will serve as an impediment to successful adoption and 
application of the attitude. The tendency to become entrenched in a posi-
tion and immovable from it is widespread in law, politics, and personal 
and professional relations of all types. Yet, because lawyers typically 
begin their professional task with a predetermined position, they are 
more susceptible to the tendency to seize and freeze9 on a particular posi-
tion rather than fully explore a problem and potential conclusions. An 
attitude of suspended conclusion can lead to better thinking and arguing, 
and better outcomes in a variety of lawyering settings by fighting the 
tendency to seize and freeze. Lawyers should aspire to inculcate it as a 
discipline in their thought processes, even in the face of limitations to be 
discussed later. 
There are several areas of seemingly related literature that need not 
be discussed in any detail in order to advance this Article’s thesis. This 
includes literature and study from several areas of educational philoso-
phy, psychology, and pedagogy, as well as most of Dewey’s work out-
side the relevant portions of How We Think. This Article does not intend 
to enter areas already laid with substantial cover. This Article also does 
not enter the debate on teaching or learning techniques, processes, or me-
thods, although I have briefly surveyed those subjects elsewhere.10 
                                                                                                             
happen, and mankind does not bother about them. It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the 
analysis of the obvious.” ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 4 
(1925). 
 8. Several other adages come to mind, such as “Look before you leap,” “Don’t put the cart 
before the horse,” “Don’t jump to conclusions,” “Fools rush in,” or “Don’t count your chickens 
before they hatch.” One must run the race before crossing the finish line. 
 9. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cogni-
tive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 669 (2004) (discussing the seize and freeze tendency recognized 
in psychology and applicable to lawyers). 
 10. See Donald J. Kochan, “Learning” Research and Legal Education: A Brief Overview and 
Selected Bibliographical Survey, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 449 (2011) (documenting much of the available 
research in the “thinking like a lawyer” literature). 
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One particular body of scholarship and commentary that deserves 
special recognition because it is distinguishable from this Article is the 
pervasive and extensive literature on “thinking like a lawyer.”11 Too 
much emphasis has been given to the idea of thinking like a lawyer and 
not enough to “thinking like a thinker.” A review of the literature reveals 
that there is little agreement on what thinking like a lawyer means or if it 
means anything at all.12 
The discourse on thinking like a lawyer ranges across a number of 
approaches and critiques. This Article does not attempt to evaluate these 
varied opinions,13 endorse any particular view on the subject, or discern 
the relative truth or importance of the thinking like a lawyer mantra for 
the process of educating legal minds. Indeed, some conceptions of what 
it means to think like a lawyer may actually impede our ability to think 
like thinkers. Whatever thinking like a lawyer means or whatever process 
of learning techniques help achieve it in law school—theoretical versus 
practical or clinical, visual versus verbal, lecture versus Socratic Method, 
problems versus cases versus narratives, and other like disputes—a rule 
that guides lawyers away from instant gratification and the instinctual 
demand for answers and instead toward suspended conclusion and its 
implicit and concomitant demand for employing reflective inquiry surely 
fits within each approach. Rather than trying to figure out how a lawyer 
thinks, this Article aims to figure out how a thinker thinks and asks that 
each lawyer aspire as a lawyer to be a thinker. 
This Article posits that the attitude of suspended conclusion is an 
important weapon in the arsenal of attack whenever one is asked to think 
and approach problems. John Dewey’s How We Think should be a must-
read for lawyers and thinkers of all types,14 and it has particular insights 
and utility for training the mind (legal or otherwise). The training of 
good mental habits requires adopting the attitude of suspended conclu-
                                                 
 11. See id. For an excellent survey of the literature on the debates within academic scholarship 
surrounding the thinking like a lawyer concept, see Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to 
Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 121, 121 nn.1–33 (1994). 
 12. Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive 
Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 413, 413 (2007) (“Despite the popularity 
of the phrase, legal scholars have not agreed on a detailed conception of what ‘thinking like a law-
yer’ means.”); see Kochan, supra note 10, at 451. 
 13. See Eric Mills Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering—Case Method in a Function-
al Context, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 535–36 (1976) (“Since most law teachers perceive that legal 
education is failing in some critical way to do its job, there is no shortage of solutions proffered for 
this malaise.”). 
 14. See George W. Pieper, The Educational Classics, 4 HIST. EDUC. J. 78, 79 (1953) (listing 
How We Think as number fourteen on the list of great books in the field of education from a jury of 
132 college and university professors). 
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sion and mastering the requisite methods of analysis that must be em-
ployed before reaching any resolution of a legal problem. 
Before diving into the attitude of suspended conclusion, Part II 
briefly introduces the reader to John Dewey’s vast corpus of work, prin-
cipally to understand his influence and to narrow the scope of this Ar-
ticle. Part III discusses, again briefly, Dewey’s limited work dedicated 
specifically to issues of legal reasoning and the application of logic to 
legal problem-solving. It explains that no single theory of logic or me-
thod is necessary to understand the attitude of suspended conclusion at 
the core of this Article’s discussion. 
Part IV moves into the heart of this Article’s thesis, explaining the 
necessity and utility of training and instilling disciplined thought. This 
Part explains that there is a fundamental place in legal education for a 
focus on the thinking enterprise, and that every lawyer should understand 
and learn in his constant and continuing education of practice and expe-
rience the benefits of adopting an attitude of suspended conclusion in the 
exercise of his profession. Part V then expands the analysis and meaning 
of Dewey’s attitude of suspended conclusion and explains the impor-
tance of developing an appreciation for an art and discipline for attaining 
that attitude. 
Part VI provides a brief survey of the research related to psycholog-
ical tendencies or poor habits that form barriers to the effective adoption 
of an attitude of suspended conclusion. We have learned that certain fal-
libilities exist in the human condition that disadvantage an individual’s 
effective thought. Part VII explains that, through education and certain 
debiasing techniques, some of these debilitating tendencies may be over-
come. 
Finally, Part VIII questions whether lawyers are in a unique posi-
tion where full adoption of an attitude of suspended conclusion in their 
practice is not only difficult but in some cases also impossible—
particularly because lawyers most often advocate for a particular client 
and must commit to a client’s position. 
Before venturing further, it is important to caution that one should 
not dismiss this premise as too obvious to study. Dewey has a knack for 
revealing the importance of many things that are seemingly ordinary but 
analysis of them is critical to educators and other thinkers alike. Dewey 
“gives voice to the ordinary, the issues that everyone must recognize 
once they take seriously the problems of educational practice.”15 By the 
end of the Article, it should be clear that reaching an understanding of 
                                                 
 15. Thomas F. Green, Unwrapping the Ordinary: Philosophical Projects, 100 AM. J. EDUC. 
84, 105 n.8 (1991). 
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the attitude of suspended conclusion and stamping it in our minds is an 
effort beyond the ordinary. Exposing the counterproductive deceptions of 
obviousness and ordinariness attached to concepts like the attitude of 
suspended conclusion and consequently appreciating the seriousness of 
adherence to that disciplined attitude are central themes in the discus-
sions that follow. 
II. A BRIEF NOTE ON DEWEY AND HIS LARGER CORPUS OF WORK 
The lessons in How We Think serve lawyers and legal thinkers well 
in dealing with some of the “thinking problems” they must overcome to 
be successful. Although How We Think was originally intended as a 
guide for elementary school teachers,16 most of its teachings transcend 
time and apply regardless of educative stage.17 In 1920, Samuel Chester 
Parker (then Dean of the College of Education at the University of Chi-
cago) wrote: “John Dewey is himself one of America’s greatest thinkers 
and is at the same time a trained psychologist who has specialized in the 
study of thinking processes . . . . Consequently, his book How We Think 
(1910) deserves very special study.”18 Some view publication of How We 
Think as a key moment in the history regarding the research and theory 
of human problem-solving.19 
                                                 
 16. Laurel N. Tanner, The Path Not Taken: Dewey’s Model of Inquiry, 18 CURRICULUM 
INQUIRY 471, 476 (1988). 
 17. In a contemporary review, B.H. Bode, a philosophy professor then at the University of 
Illinois, praised the universal lessons of How We Think: 
Professor Dewey’s qualifications for the task he has set himself are too well known to re-
quire comment; it is sufficient to say that in this book he is even more successful than 
usual. Teachers of all kinds will find the book a source of stimulus and enlightenment, 
and they will doubtless give to it the cordial welcome which it so eminently deserves. 
B.H. Bode, Book Review, 18 SCH. REV. 642, 645 (1910). See also W.B. Pillsbury, Book Review, 20 
PHIL. REV. 441, 442 (1911); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Perspective from the Bench on the Value of Clini-
cal Appellate Training of Law Students, 75 MISS. L.J. 645, 660 (2006) (“John Dewey’s advice to 
teachers in generations past is still vital and important today.”); cf. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong 
With Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 648 (2007) (“[L]aw stu-
dents . . . generally arrive in law school with almost no knowledge of the legal system . . . . Thus, a 
substantial amount of intellectual development occurs during the course of their three years.”). 
 18. Samuel Chester Parker, Problem-Solving or Practice in Thinking IV, 21 ELEMENTARY 
SCH. J. 257, 257 (1920) [hereinafter Parker, Problem-Solving IV]. Parker discusses Dewey’s sus-
pended conclusion concept in SAMUEL CHESTER PARKER, METHODS OF TEACHING IN HIGH 
SCHOOLS 194 (rev. ed. 1920) [hereinafter PARKER, METHODS OF TEACHING] (“The maintenance of 
the attitude of suspended conclusion . . . means that [the student] will evaluate . . . hypotheses in an 
open-minded and unbiased way.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Irving Tallman et al., A Theory of Problem-Solving Behavior, 56 SOC. PSYCHOL. 
Q. 157, 157 (1993) (“Research and theory about human problem-solving have a long and circuitous 
history. Although this has been a central theme for students of human behavior at least since the time 
of John Dewey (1910), it is difficult to identify any consistent, cumulative body of knowledge about 
problem-solving that has been generated by nearly a century of research.”). But see Cecil Miller, 
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There can be little doubt that Dewey has been an intellectual force 
of high recognition.20 Dewey was a prominent, prolific, and pioneering 
pedagogue.21 His contributions have been extensively discussed through-
out the literature of varying academic disciplines.22 Dewey’s body of 
work is voluminous,23 known for its accessibility to diverse readership, 
and touches on a variety of areas from education to philosophy to social 
theory.24 His works have made an impact on a number of important de-
bates ranging from fields of philosophy and education to social reform.25 
This Article neither attempts nor intends to fully digest that massive con-
tribution to thought.26 
This Article’s endeavor will be successful only if it is narrowed to 
Dewey’s work on suspended conclusion within his concept of reflective 
thought and almost exclusively limited to its explication in How We 
                                                                                                             
Complete and Incomplete Acts of Thought, 77 ETHICS 67, 67 (1966) (questioning the universal ap-
plicability of Dewey’s theories on method in How We Think to the social sciences). 
 20. The Center for Dewey Studies at Southern Illinois University (SIU), Carbondale has the 
most comprehensive collection of research materials by or about Dewey and continues to increase 
awareness and understanding of Dewey’s work and influence. CTR. FOR DEWEY STUDIES AT SIU 
CARBONDALE, http://www.siuc.edu/~deweyctr/index.html (last visited June 30, 2011); see also Jo 
Ann Boydston, The Dewey Center and the Collected Works of John Dewey, 13 FREE INQUIRY 19 
(1992) (describing the Dewey Center at SIU collection as its (now former) director). 
 21. HENRY J. PERKINSON, TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT 218 
(Univ. Press of Am. 1987) (1976) (“Dewey wrote some forty books and over seven hundred ar-
ticles.”). 
 22. In fact, collecting the work on Dewey’s work itself required herculean efforts by two mas-
sive projects that were undertaken to catalogue the vast literature discussing the subject of John 
Dewey. The first comprehensive effort for a bibliography of commentary or biography on Dewey 
was published as CHECKLIST OF WRITINGS ABOUT JOHN DEWEY, 1887–1977 (Jo Ann Boydston & 
Kathleen Poulos eds., 2d ed. 1978) and WORKS ABOUT JOHN DEWEY, 1886–1995 (Barbara Levine 
ed., 1996) (including more than 4,900 entries of books, articles, or other material about Dewey and 
his work). Some significant biographies about Dewey include GEORGE DYKHUIZEN, THE LIFE AND 
MIND OF JOHN DEWEY (1973); SIDNEY HOOK, JOHN DEWEY: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT (1939); 
and THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY (Paul A. Schilp ed., 1939) (including a biographical chapter 
by his daughter, Jane). 
 23. A comprehensive collection of John Dewey’s work has been published in the thirty-seventh 
volume THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1882–1953 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1969–1991), 
which is comprised of three series: THE EARLY WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1882–1898 (Jo Ann 
Boydston ed., 1969); THE MIDDLE WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1899–1924 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 
1976); and THE LATER WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1925–1953) (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1976). See also 
MILTON HALSEY THOMAS, JOHN DEWEY: A CENTENNIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (1962). 
 24. Dorothy H. Evensen et al., Where Have You Gone, John Dewey?: Locating the Challenge 
to Continue and the Challenge to Grow as a Profession, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 19, 25 (2003) (“De-
wey lived a long, productive life and was one of the most prolific yet popular philosophers of any 
era.”). For help working through it all, see JO ANN BOYDSTON, GUIDE TO THE WORKS OF JOHN 
DEWEY (1970). 
 25. Barbara Levine, Preface to WORKS ABOUT JOHN DEWEY, 1886–1995, at x (Barbara Levine 
ed., 1996) (“Saluted by Life magazine in 1990 as one of ‘the 100 most important Americans of the 
20th century,’ Dewey’s thoughts and ideas have influenced contemporary thought for over a century 
and continue to arouse attention today.”). 
 26. See PERKINSON, supra note 21, at 218. 
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Think. To understand these focused concepts, it is unnecessary to delve 
into the full body of Dewey’s diverse work and thought. I leave that to 
more ambitious authors who have come before27 and to those who will 
undoubtedly examine the man and his work in all its complexities in the 
future. 
Dewey’s work is so diverse that it cannot help but evoke substantial 
commentary ranging from praise to sharp controversy and criticism. Bar-
bara Levine28 explains: 
At one time or another Dewey wrote about education, philosophy, 
politics, logic, psychology, and ethics, and seemed equally at ease 
in all these fields. At times his writings stimulated agreement; at 
times they piqued curiosity; at times they provoked sharp controver-
sy and criticism. In recent years they have continued to stimulate, 
pique, and provoke.29 
Given these realities, it would be foolish to attempt to tackle the entire 
field of Dewey’s work. Thus, Dewey’s philosophies on how we learn 
and his work on social policy and in other fields are necessarily outside 
the scope of this Article. 
It is not necessary to understand or address his full range of views 
on the arts, ethics, political systems, democracy, war, economic systems, 
capitalism, socialism, the individual and society, social change, pragmat-
ism, naturalism, religion, morality, culture, being, science, evolution, 
metaphysics, reality, or a host of other matters—all subjects within the 
universe of Dewey’s work. Nor is it even necessary to understand or ad-
dress to the full extent his theories and reflections on philosophy, sociol-
ogy, or other works on psychology. Moreover, the fact that some of De-
wey’s work may be claimed to be ideologically charged or the result of 
certain political preferences on his part should be irrelevant to this dis-
cussion, as suspended conclusion is neutral on many of these topics and 
should be embraced regardless of such issues. 
Nor must we explore comprehensively Dewey’s views on those 
areas more closely related to the subject of this Article, such as educa-
tion, pedagogy, experiential learning and other participatory pedagogies, 
knowledge, logic, or inquiry. For example, in one of the very few articles 
discussing Dewey’s theories as they relate to law school education, Ed-
                                                 
 27. See, e.g., Evensen et al., supra note 24, at 22 (describing Dewey’s basic philosophy of 
education and the learning process). 
 28. Levine is the long-time textual editor at the Center for Dewey Studies at Southern Illinois 
University and editor of the valuable bibliographical reference text, Works About John Dewey. See 
Staff, CTR. FOR DEWEY STUDIES AT SIU CARBONDALE, http://www.siuc.edu/~deweyctr/info_staff 
.html. 
 29. Levine, supra note 25, at x. 
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ward Rubin focuses on Dewey’s theories relating to how to learn—
learning processes, mental development, experiential learning, etc.—
rather than the more basic, limited concept discussed in this Article.30 
Similarly, a recent book by Paul Maharg delves into Dewey but in ways 
irrelevant to this Article.31 That book advocates a transactional and tech-
nology-enhanced transformation toward the democratization of legal 
education, discussing Dewey’s social views on education and his views 
on legal logic32—areas again outside this Article’s lens. 
This part of Dewey’s work is beyond the scope of this Article pre-
cisely because it distracts from the isolated importance of the suspended 
conclusion concept, which endures as a guiding rule regardless of what 
teaching method is employed or what belief on learning processes is em-
braced.33 One need not agree with Dewey’s progressivism or views on 
public education, for example, to measure the merit of the suspended 
conclusion concept. 
Whether you agree or disagree with Dewey in any of the areas men-
tioned above, he is a fascinating intellectual figure. This Article will re-
main agnostic on all but the suspended conclusion concept. My hope is 
that those who disagree with Dewey on other things can set aside those 
differences and independently evaluate the merit of suspending conclu-
sion.34 By narrowing the discussion here to only that concept, the impor-
tance of the attitude of suspended conclusion will be presented and ab-
sorbed with greater clarity than would a comprehensive survey of De-
wey’s scholarship and opinion. I expect that some may argue that this 
particular concept cannot be divorced from Dewey’s overall philoso-
phies, but I cannot now theorize the supporting argument enough to pro-
vide an anticipatory response, for the suspended conclusion concept is 
ideologically neutral. Should this Article’s segregation of the suspended 
conclusion concept meet such a retort, however, I will meet the challenge 
at that time. Finally, as the suspended conclusion concept is only a useful 
shorthand and template for discussion of principles accepted and adopted 
by other persons and under different terms, this Article need not rest on 
                                                 
 30. Rubin, supra note 17, at 645–49. 
 31. See generally PAUL MAHARG, TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION: LEARNING AND 
TEACHING THE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007). 
 32. Id. at 7. 
 33. Rubin’s acknowledgement of Dewey’s overall contribution, however, is worth noting. 
Rubin states that Dewey is “one of America’s most distinguished philosophers” and suggests that 
“[w]hile Dewey’s approach to education—and to epistemology for that matter—has been a matter of 
controversy, the basic insights that underlie his approach are central to nearly all theories of pedago-
gy in the twentieth century.” Rubin, supra note 17, at 646, 648. 
 34. One might say that I am asking the reader to suspend conclusion on the merits of sus-
pended conclusion. 
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an appeal to authority but instead on the truth and utility of the basic 
premises themselves. 
III. DEWEY’S WORK ON LOGIC AND LEGAL REASONING 
Parts of Dewey’s broader work include discussions of legal reason-
ing and logic that have some utility and application in this Article’s anal-
ysis, but their relevance is limited. Dewey only minimally directed his 
attention to legal reasoning.35 Nonetheless, his few forays36 into law de-
serve brief discussion. 
The only notable publication by Dewey regarding both logic and 
legal reasoning was a 1924 article in the Cornell Law Quarterly.37 As 
one reviewer put it, that article did “not amount to a systematic treatment 
of law” but was instead a piece focused on general theory.38 Portions of 
his book, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, also touch on some reasoning 
skills and general theory applicable to legal reasoning.39 
Dewey’s more detailed examination of inquiry is similar but suffi-
ciently distinct from the isolated concept of suspended conclusion. None-
theless, a basic introduction to it may help one understand why the sus-
pended conclusion concept is an important and necessary precondition 
for any theory of logic or inquiry. At the very least, effective inquiry re-
quires the intervention of deliberation or thinking prior to reaching con-
clusions: 
In the other sort of case, action follows upon a decision, and the de-
cision is the outcome of inquiry, comparison of alternatives, weigh-
ing of facts; deliberation or thinking has intervened. Considerations 
which have weight in reaching the conclusion as to what is to be 
done, or which are employed to justify it when it is questioned, are 
called “reasons.” If they are stated in sufficiently general terms they 
are “principles.” When the operation is formulated in a compact 
way, the decision is called a conclusion, and the considerations 
which led up to it are called the premises. Decisions of the first type 
may be reasonable: that is, they may be adapted to good results; 
those of the second type are reasoned or rational, increasingly so, in 
the degree of care and thoroughness with which inquiry has been 
                                                 
 35. Mark Mendell, Dewey and the Logic of Legal Reasoning, 30 TRANSACTIONS CHARLES S. 
PEIRCE SOC’Y 575, 577 (1994) (criticizing Dewey’s work on legal reasoning). 
 36. Id. (“[Dewey had] few extended forays into the philosophy of law.”). 
 37. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924) [hereinafter Dewey, 
Logical Method]. The article was also published as John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 33 PHIL. 
REV. 560 (1924). 
 38. Mendell, supra note 35, at 625 n.3. 
 39. See generally JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938). 
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conducted and the order in which connections have been established 
between the considerations dealt with.40 
The intervention of thinking—meaning here, deliberation—is necessary 
before reaching a conclusion no matter what method of inquiry is used, 
Dewey’s or others. 
A few other speeches and publications relevant to legal theory are 
discussed and cited in articles addressing this area of Dewey’s thought.41 
Yet, Dewey saw his examination of logic as related but distinct from his 
enterprise on the “thinking” concepts like suspended conclusion covered 
in How We Think.42 
Moreover, to the extent logic plays any role in the attitude of sus-
pended conclusion, it is in the broader meaning of the term. In How We 
Think, Dewey posits that the “more vital and more practical” use of the 
word “logical” is used “to denote, namely, the systematic care, negative 
and positive, taken to safeguard reflection so that it may yield the best 
results under the given conditions.”43 In that sense, any theory of logic 
must demand at least some type of thoughtful examination before reach-
ing a conclusion. Dewey explains: 
In this sense, the word logical is synonymous with wide-awake, 
thorough, and careful reflection—thought in its best sense. Reflec-
tion is turning a topic over in various aspects and in various lights 
so that nothing significant about it shall be overlooked—almost as 
one might turn a stone over to see what its hidden side is like or 
what is covered by it. Thoughtfulness means, practically, the same 
thing as careful attention; to give our mind to a subject is to give 
heed to it, to take pains with it. In speaking of reflection, we natu-
rally use the words weigh, ponder, deliberate—terms implying a 
certain delicate and scrupulous balancing of things against one an-
                                                 
 40. Dewey, Logical Method, supra note 37, at 17. 
 41. See, e.g., Nathan Isaacs, How Lawyers Think, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 556 (1923) (early 
thinking like a lawyer article focusing on Dewey’s then recent attention to that subject matter); 
Mendell, supra note 35, at 575. 
 42. For commentary and analysis, see, for example, Tanner, supra note 16, at 476 (discussing 
Dewey’s work on inquiry). Tanner observes that Dewey’s later works moved away from the term 
“thinking” as his focus of examination in part because of its seemingly wide berth: 
Dewey’s concept of thinking as problem-solving was explained clearly in How We Think 
and in an enormous number of other works . . . . [T]he term ‘thinking’ carried some 
heavy baggage; it was associated in the minds of most people with exclusively mental ac-
tivity. This is probably why Dewey substituted the term ‘inquiry’ for ‘reflective thinking’ 
in his later work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. 
Id. 
 43. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 56. 
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other. Closely related names are scrutiny, examination, considera-
tion, inspection—terms which imply close and careful vision.44 
Under that broad conception of the term “logical,” the requirement that 
one suspend conclusion until after some form of thorough inquiry is not 
only within the definition but also a less than controversial application of 
the term, allowing this Article to bypass the debate on logic. 
But this Article is not about logic or methods of inquiry, each with 
their own definitional baggage that elicits substantial debate. Logic need 
not be coterminous with thinking; only thinking is focused on in this Ar-
ticle. As Edward de Bono explains, “[T]hinking that is free from logical 
error is by no means necessarily good thinking. Bad logic makes for bad 
thinking, but good logic makes for good thinking only if the starting per-
ceptions are themselves appropriate.”45 If logic is about methodology, 
brain functions, or the like—about how one uses processes to reach an 
accurate or most effective conclusion—no particular theory must be en-
dorsed to support the arguments in this Article. Here, we deal instead 
with what one must do before even beginning any logical process—start 
with an attitude of suspended conclusion. Only when a conclusion is sus-
pended is room made for the application of any process at all, whatever 
its character. As one set of authors noted, “[M]ethod-centered issues, as 
important as they may be to research, become relevant only after more 
fundamental decisions about inquiry have been made.”46 
A suspended conclusion is a prerequisite to any thought process 
that deserves the name. Inquiry into or application of a logic theory can-
not begin without suspending judgment, regardless of what method of 
inquiry or theory of logic one chooses to accept as superior. Thus, De-
wey’s broader views on the proper methods of reasoning—legal or oth-
erwise—need not be examined or judged against competing methods in 
order to accept the proposition that the suspended conclusion concept is a 
prerequisite to the application of any method. 
With all that said, some of Dewey’s thoughts on logic and legal 
reasoning inform the interpretation and application of the attitude of sus-
pended conclusion. Nonetheless, they are sufficiently distinct and thus do 
not require any further study herein. Where relevant, however, they will 
be later mentioned. 
                                                 
 44. Id. at 57 (citation omitted). 
 45. Edward de Bono, Thinking: How It Can Be Taught, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
MIND 774, 775 (Richard L. Gregory ed., 1987). 
 46. Stephen C. Yanchar et al., Critical Thinking as Disciplinary Practice, 12 REV. GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 265, 275 (2008). 
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING AND INSTILLING 
DISCIPLINED THOUGHT 
Humans are creatures of thought, and thinking has a powerful and 
pervasive influence on human affairs. Dewey opens How We Think by 
stating that “[n]o words are oftener on our lips than thinking and thought. 
So profuse and varied, indeed, is our use of these words that it is not easy 
to define just what we mean by them.”47 We are all thinkers, and thinkers 
think. We cannot help but think, in its loose meaning, but that does not 
mean we are thinking well. 
The research on the mind, brain, neuroscience, and thinking func-
tions is extensive, complex, evolving, and constantly advancing.48 Our 
understanding is regularly moving us away from the brain as “a dark 
mystery locked in a bony box.”49 There is also a wide and rich body of 
literature on the learning enterprise generally and also for lawyers specif-
ically. I have surveyed that literature elsewhere,50 and I will not try to 
tackle the full extent of that subject here but instead will offer just a few 
simple observations. 
The attitude of suspended conclusion can be universally and inde-
pendently applied, no matter what learning theories are valid or em-
                                                 
 47. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 1; see also Kellen McClendon, The Convergence of Thinking, 
Talking, and Writing: A Theory for Improving Writing, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 21, 23, 27 nn.12, 13, 16, 28 
n.20, 30 n.24, 32 (1999) (examining the meaning of thinking, language, talking, and writing to sup-
port the thesis “that by ‘talking-out’ what we write, we can improve our writing”) (citing ROBERT 
THOMSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING (1959); NEIL BOLTON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING 
(1972); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, WHAT IS CALLED THINKING? (J. Glenn Gray trans., Harper & Row 
1968) (1954); RICHARD E. MAYER, THINKING, PROBLEM SOLVING, COGNITION (1983); W. EDGAR 
VINACKE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING (1952)). 
 48. For a fascinating introductory survey and review of brain research from the leading experts, 
see the thirteen-episode monthly telecast Charlie Rose: The Brain Series (PBS television broadcast 
Oct. 29, 2009–Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/collection/10702. The 
Brain Series was a special of the Charlie Rose Show with guest cohost Dr. Eric Kandel, winner of 
the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine “for his research into the biological mechanisms of learn-
ing and memory.” Id. Kandel’s 1,400-page text on neuroscience provides comprehensive material on 
the scientific understandings of human behavior and the workings of the neuron and brain. See ERIC 
KANDEL, PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE (4th ed. 2000). For another related comprehensive text, 
see MARGARET A. BODEN, MIND AS MACHINE: A HISTORY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE (2006) (a two 
volume, 1,600-page text on cognitive science and related disciplines). For some recent collections of 
research on the brain and mind, see, for example, BEST OF THE BRAIN FROM SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: 
MIND, MATTER, AND TOMORROW’S BRAIN (Floyd E. Bloom ed., 2007) (collecting short articles 
written between 1999 and 2006); DANA PRESS, CEREBRUM 2010: EMERGING IDEAS IN BRAIN 
SCIENCE (2010) (a collection of some of the latest articles on the brain); HOW PEOPLE LEARN: 
BRIDGING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (M. Suzanne Donavan et al. eds., 1999) (“provid[ing] a broad 
overview of research on learners and learning”). 
 49. Patricia McBroom, Thinking About How We Think, 92 SCI. NEWS 544, 544 (1967) (“De-
spite all the pioneering work done over the past 20 years in brain research, the mind is still very 
much a dark mystery locked in a bony box.”). 
 50. Kochan, supra note 10, at 449. 
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ployed in legal education and lawyering. The attitude works in any learn-
ing or teaching category, and therefore, it is unnecessary to engage in the 
debates for this Article. This Article stands amid this intimidating array 
of thought and expertise that already exists, and examines and defends 
just one proposition: the training of good mental habits requires adopting 
the attitude of suspended conclusion and mastering the requisite methods 
of analysis that must be employed before reaching any resolution of a 
legal problem. Keeping in line with the philosophical approach of Dewey 
himself,51 this Article rests its claim for making a unique contribution on 
the raw simplicity and limited scope of its undertaking. This claim rests 
only on its attempt to remind thinkers to take constant cognizance of a 
rather uncontroversial and deceptively unremarkable concept or rule in 
the abstract52 that perplexingly faces regular opposition from a habitual 
and impulsive disregard in practice. That is the sum of this Article’s pur-
pose and role, carved out from the landscape of literature that has pre-
ceded this endeavor. 
In this Part, I will speak of the educator’s role in teaching and instil-
ling a discipline of effective thinking, but the points made will be equally 
relevant outside the classroom and into the practice of law and the prac-
tice of thinking everywhere. Lawyers must seek out such teachings as a 
discipline of practice and for the continued enhancement of their skills. 
To the extent our minds can understand how we think and harness 
the skills that maximize our potential to think more effectively, lessons 
on thinking should be consumed just as aggressively, if not more, so that 
we might consume doctrine in pursuit of becoming the foremost expert 
on a particular subject of law. Thinking skills are unique; they are differ-
ent than knowledge-absorption skills and deserve distinct treatment.53 
                                                 
 51. “Dewey is essentially one of those philosophers who . . . impress the world with their pro-
found simplicity.” MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT: A CRITICAL SKETCH 367 (Felix 
S. Cohen ed., 1954). As R.H. Bode of the University of Illinois commented, How We Think is “that 
rare kind of book in which simplicity is the outcome of seasoned scholarship in diverse fields.” 
Bode, supra note 17, at 642. 
 52. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s words are relevant and supportive here: 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity 
and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one’s 
eyes). The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has 
at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is 
most striking and most powerful. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Pt. I, ¶ 129 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 
1953). Or one can glean support from the curious mind of Sherlock Holmes: “There is nothing more 
deceptive than an obvious fact.” 1 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Adventures of Sherlock Holmes: The 
Boscombe Valley Mystery, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 239, 241 (George Stade et al. 
eds., Barnes & Noble Classics 2003) (1891). 
 53. de Bono, supra note 45, at 774 (“It seems that the practical operating skills of thinking 
(decision, judgement, assessment of priorities, breadth of scan) are not the same as the knowledge-
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The struggle to determine what we mean by the terms “thinking” and 
“thought”—and perhaps more importantly, the pursuit of understanding 
thinking itself—are inherent in the proper role of education and mindful 
exploration.54 
Aside from how things should be taught or how things are learned, 
thinking is a skill that is susceptible to improvement and a proper subject 
for lawyer development, even if only through self-education. The educa-
tor should embrace the training of thought and seek to instill disciplined 
adherence to certain obvious lessons.55 The lawyer should exercise this 
discipline to maximize the effectiveness of thinking critical to the evalua-
tion of the legal problems faced in practice. 
Dewey introduces the 1933 edition of How We Think differently, 
with an important caution as to the purposes of the lessons in his text and 
consequently adds light to the purposes of this Article. Dewey states: 
No one can tell another person in any definite way how he should 
think, any more than how he ought to breathe or have his blood cir-
culate. But the various ways in which men do think can be told and 
can be described in their general features. Some of these ways are 
better than others; the reasons why they are better can be set forth. 
The person who understands what the better ways of thinking are 
and why they are better can, if he will, change his own personal 
ways until they become more effective . . . .56 
In the educative role, we can explore thinking in that light—to under-
stand some basic realities and tendencies of undisciplined thought and 
ignite the human capacity and desire to improve in a manner that can 
alter thinking behaviors or address debilitating habits that hinder fulfill-
ment of the possibilities of thought. 
                                                                                                             
absorbing skills (perceiving relationships, attention skills, ordering information, memorizing).”). 
William O. Douglas’s counsel that critical judgment and disciplined learning endure as the perma-
nent value of legal education is apt here: 
The body of “knowledge” pounded into the heads of law students does not survive long 
after Bar examinations are passed. Law, like engineering, changes fast. The so-called 
“practical facts” soon become obsolete. The only knowledge of permanent value—in law 
as elsewhere—is theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge, critical judgment, and 
the discipline of learning are the only enduring aspects of legal education which make the 
individual readily adaptable to changing situations and problems. 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN 169 (1974). 
 54. Tanner, supra note 16, at 476 (“Critical thinking as problem solving can and should func-
tion in any discipline or area of human experience.”). 
 55. William J. Pauli, Confusion and Problem Solving, 35 CLEARING HOUSE 79, 79 (1960) 
(“Everybody would agree that learning to think and learning to solve problems are the highest and 
most important objectives of education.”). 
 56. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 3. 
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To “think” is defined as “conceive in or exercise the mind,” “medi-
tate on, turn over in the mind, ponder,” and “exercise the mind, esp. the 
understanding, in a positive, active way; form connected ideas; meditate, 
cogitate.”57 Think connotes action. Idle exercise is an oxymoron. Think-
ers must think; if one does not think, then one is not a thinker at all but 
simply a vessel with an idle capacity. Identifying when we are thinking, 
understanding how we tend to think, and preparing ourselves for the 
workout involved based on that self-reflection can make the exercise 
more fulfilling and rewarding. In this sense, education and awareness of 
thinking can be a wellness program for the mind. We risk mental atrophy 
when we do not practice thought,58 and just as stretching the muscles is 
required to maximize the effectiveness of exercising the legs before a 
good run, so too are educators needed to serve as trainers who prepare us 
for thought. Attention to the skills of thinking and its practice maximizes 
its development.59 
Regardless of whether one agrees with Dewey’s larger work on 
how to train minds to think, his basic premise that it is the business of 
education to train minds in some way—to instill positive habits of 
thought—seems incontestable: 
[I]t is [the] business [of education] to cultivate deep-seated and ef-
fective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, 
guesses, and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-
minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded, and 
to ingrain into the individual’s working habits methods of inquiry 
and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present 
themselves. No matter how much an individual knows as a matter 
of hearsay and information, if he has not attitudes and habits of this 
sort, he is not intellectually educated. He lacks the rudiments of 
mental discipline. And since these habits are not a gift of nature (no 
matter how strong the aptitude for acquiring them); since, moreover, 
the casual circumstances of the natural and social environment are 
not enough to compel their acquisition, the main office of education 
is to supply conditions that make for their cultivation.60 
Such educational training of thought is particularly necessary when 
one considers exogenous influences that impede the effectiveness of 
                                                 
 57. 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3243 (5th ed. 2003). 
 58. Cf. DANIEL G. AMEN, MAKING A GOOD BRAIN GREAT 115 (2005) (“Like muscles that 
don’t get used, idle nerve cells waste away.”). 
 59. Id. at 113 (“Your brain is like a muscle: the more you use it, the more you can continue 
using it . . . . No matter what your age, mental exercise has a global, positive effect on your brain.”); 
see also de Bono, supra note 45, at 775 (“It is not really surprising that skill can be developed by 
direct attention and practice.”). 
 60. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 27–28. 
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thought. Dewey contends, “The very importance of thought for life 
makes necessary its control by education because of its natural tendency 
to go astray, and because social influences exist that tend to form habits 
of thought leading to inadequate and erroneous beliefs.”61 This is not to 
say that an educator should dictate what to think, and if that were De-
wey’s meaning, then I would surely disagree with him. But cultivating 
thinking skills that are content-neutral in outcomes and developing posi-
tive habits of thought should be encouraged.62 
According to some scholars, thinking is an independent skill that 
must be independently taught and practiced and does not emerge organi-
cally through mere subject-oriented discussions that require thought.63 
When developed as an independent discipline, a thinking skill can be 
flexible and adaptive to situations rather than confined to a particular 
content-based application. As de Bono explains, 
In education we also assume that from an interested discussion on 
some subject, pupils will abstract certain habits and skills of think-
ing and transfer them to new situations. This does not seem to hap-
pen. Such discussions increase fluency but seem to provide little 
transferable skill. If, rather, we create, quite deliberately, various at-
tention-directing tools, these tools can then be practiced on a rapidly 
changing variety of situations. This change is necessary so that at-
tention stays on the tool and does not drift to the content—as it 
would if content remained constant.64 
In that light, the attitude of suspended conclusion could be categorized as 
such a directing tool—an independent discipline that can have wide ap-
plication and is not subject- or vocation-dependent. The attitude also fits 
in with what some have termed a type of “enabling condition” that makes 
effective thinking possible.65 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 29. 
 62. McElroy & Coughlin, supra note 4, at 228 (“[P]rofessors should instruct [students] to 
address counter-analysis as a critical component of [thoughtful legal] analysis.”); Nelson P. Miller & 
Bradley J. Charles, Meeting the Carnegie Report Challenge to Make Legal Analysis Explicit—
Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC Format, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 192, 194 (2009) (“It may seem too ob-
vious to say that thinking is the most basic skill necessary to effectively use the IRAC framework. 
But law students, as much or more so than students of other professional studies, must learn to think 
with an energy and consistency that they probably have never before maintained. . . . Thus, students 
should learn some of the practices that promote effective thinking.”). 
 63. de Bono, supra note 45, at 774. 
 64. Id. at 775. 
 65. Yanchar et al., supra note 46, at 268 (Enabling conditions “describe the theoretical back-
ground that makes any understanding, including disciplined inquiry or critical thinking, possi-
ble . . . . [T]hey provide an essential starting point that will guide critical analysis and permit one to 
produce judgments of one type or another.”). 
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Even if we are thinking well for purposes of a particular situation, 
that does not mean we are developing transferable thinking skills with 
adaptive application. “A skill that is built up by coping with the imme-
diate situation may never develop beyond” a basic level of accomplish-
ing the immediate task.66 
Many do claim that thinking must be nurtured by training and prac-
tice.67 However, one can be perfectly skilled at something by practice—
like being prejudiced in one’s affairs—but that skill may be inhibiting as 
action without reflection. Just because we practice something, and get 
good at it, does not mean that we are exercising a sound choice in what 
we have chosen to repeat.68 Practice can be insufficient because we can 
develop bad habits. Like with learning the piano or typing on a keyboard, 
we are prone to develop bad habits through the practice of poor me-
thods.69 
Dewey agrees that practice is important, but he believes it has li-
mited value. True benefits come from the development of certain atti-
tudes, of which suspended conclusion has primacy.70 The term “attitude” 
is generally defined as “settled behavior, as representing feeling or opi-
nion; (also attitude of mind) settled mode of thinking.”71 There are good 
habits or attitudes of how a specialist (like a lawyer) should think, but not 
all ways in which a specialist thinks are universally applicable habits of 
mind: 
[I]t is highly questionable whether the practice of thinking in accor-
dance with some logical formula results in creation of a general ha-
bit of thinking; namely one applicable over a wide range of sub-
jects. It is a matter of common notice that men who are expert 
thinkers in their own special fields adopt views on other matters 
without doing the inquiring that they know to be necessary for subs-
tantiating simpler facts that fall within their own special-
ties . . . . What can be done, however, is to cultivate those attitudes 
that are favorable to the use of the best methods of inquiry and test-
ing. Knowledge of the methods alone will not suffice; there must be 
the desire, the will, to employ them. This desire is an affair of per-
sonal disposition. But on the other hand the disposition alone will 
not suffice. There must also be an understanding of the forms and 
                                                 
 66. de Bono, supra note 45, at 774. 
 67. Id. (describing the difference between thinking skills picked in ordinary situations and out 
of necessity and those that excel after training). 
 68. Id. 
 69. AMEN, supra note 58, at 119. 
 70. DEWEY, supra note 1. 
 71. 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 147 (5th ed. 2003). 
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techniques that are the channels through which these attitudes oper-
ate to the best advantage.72 
Thus, thinking attitudes play a pivotal role; educators can work to nurture 
them, and lawyers can seek them out.73 
For purposes of the legal educator, whether a lawyer thinks like a 
lawyer and whether that can or should be taught as a special skill is irre-
levant to the subject discussed here. Most certainly a lawyer at least 
thinks, and at least part of the educator’s role and the lawyer’s obligation 
is to cultivate and inculcate the basics of effective thought.74 It is a ne-
cessary and reasonable aspect of the educator’s assignment and obliga-
tion, and a crucial discipline for the lawyer–thinker. 
The application of the suspended conclusion concept to legal prob-
lem-solving therefore does not depend on whether the lawyer has any 
special or discrete thinking skills, or needs them in other parts of the le-
gal occupation. In legal practice, adherence to an attitude of suspended 
conclusion is simply a situational application of a broader concept of 
thinking, and not thinking like a lawyer per se. 
Thinking is vital to communication skills.75 Consequently, under-
standing thought is particularly relevant to effective writing76 and should 
therefore be of particular interest to lawyers who depend on writing skills 
in their profession and law students who depend on writing skills for 
their grades and preparation for practice. As court of appeals Judge Ken-
neth Ripple has counseled, “[A] good writing instructor ought to take the 
lead in convincing students that, in essence, the law school experience is 
an education in how to think.”77 
Finally, legal educators and lawyers’ attention is necessary because 
we may give regard to positive habits of the thinking task, commit our-
selves to following them, and believe that we will follow them, only to 
                                                 
 72. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 29–30. 
 73. Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in 
Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 731, 749 (2003) (“[T]he 
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 74. Barry K. Beyer, Improving Thinking Skills: Defining the Problem, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 
486 (1984) (citing Dewey’s How We Think when stating that “[e]ver since the turn of the century, 
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subject areas”). 
 75. McClendon, supra note 47, at 24 (“Without question, the overall process of communicating 
(whether in the form of writing, talking, or sign language) begins with thinking. Thus to understand 
communication, and in particular writing, we must have some understanding of what thinking is.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kenneth F. Ripple, Legal Writing in the New Millenium: Lessons from a Special Teacher 
and a Special “Classroom,” 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925, 928–29 (1999). 
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actually disregard them in everyday practice.78 Psychologists have rec-
ognized a phenomenon known as the “bias blind spot.” Lilienfeld et al. 
explain: 
[T]he term bias blind spot, more informally called the “not me fal-
lacy,” refers to the belief that others are biased but that we are not. 
Research shows that people readily recognize confirmation bias and 
related biases in others, but not in themselves. The bias blind spot, 
which we can think of as a “meta-bias,” leads us to believe that only 
others, not ourselves, interpret evidence in a distorted fashion.79 
To overcome this bias blind spot, lawyers and aspiring thinkers of all 
types need to recognize such naturally occurring inhibiting tendencies 
and false beliefs. Only by reevaluating whether our actual thinking is 
synchronized with the obvious demands of effective thinking can we be 
sure that we have not fallen prey to this “not me” phenomenon that per-
petuates bad thinking. It is, indeed, a substantial hurdle because individ-
uals may be unreceptive to efforts to teach disciplined thinking “because 
of the bias blind spot (i.e., they do not perceive themselves as biased and 
therefore in need of remediation).”80 As Parker states while referencing 
Dewey, 
The teacher should encourage pupils to maintain an attitude of sus-
pended conclusion or suspended judgment. This is necessary not 
only in order to provide for a thorough canvass of the problem but 
also in order to obviate bias which may interfere with the thinker’s 
selection and evaluation of data or evidence.81 
The educator is particularly well-situated to exercise a role in stimulating 
thinking and to guard against what appears to some as a gradual regres-
sion in regular adherence to rigor in the act.82 And the lawyer–thinker is 
                                                 
 78. Peter H. Martorella, Reflective Thinking and the American Culture, 45 PEABODY J. EDUC. 
87, 87 (1967) (“Lip-service to the value of all varieties of thinking, of course, is almost a traditional 
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 79. Scott O. Lilienfeld et al., Giving Debiasing Away: Can Psychological Research on Cor-
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the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781 (2004)). 
 80. Lilienfeld et al., supra 79, at 394. 
 81. PARKER, METHODS OF TEACHING, supra note 18, at 194. 
 82. For example, Martorella explains, 
Hopefully, those individuals who are operating in the society to stimulate thinking in all 
facets of life among all individuals will assume a more effective and leading role and 
somehow will be able to reverse, or at least slow down appreciably, what appears to be a 
steadily developing trend away from thinking. At the risk of being banal, one is again led 
to echo Dewey in suggesting that the schools be among the vanguard in promoting such 
changes . . . . 
22 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1 
in the constant position to self-evaluate and ensure that the rigor is em-
ployed in practice. 
Dewey emphasized in the 1933 edition of How We Think that we 
wander the world thinking all the time and have some vague sense of 
thinking’s importance but rarely take the time to evaluate how or why 
thinking is so important: 
We all acknowledge, in words at least, that ability to think is highly 
important; it is regarded as the distinguishing power that marks man 
off from the lower animals. But since our ordinary notions of how 
and why thinking is important are vague, it is worth while to state 
explicitly the values possessed by reflective thought. In the first 
place, it emancipates us from the merely impulsive and merely rou-
tine activity . . . . By putting the consequences of different ways and 
lines of action before the mind, it enables us to know what we are 
about when we act. It converts action that is merely appetitive, 
blind, and impulsive into intelligent action.83 
The educator’s role must include the teaching of positive habits, 
like an attitude of suspended conclusion. The thinkers’ responsibility, 
including lawyers long graduated from the classroom, is to adopt those 
habits. Dewey further counseled, “[T]he work of teaching must not only 
transform natural tendencies into trained habits of thought, but must also 
fortify the mind against irrational tendencies current in the social envi-
ronment, and help displace erroneous habits already produced.”84 The 
upcoming parts of this Article will explain those habits to be trained and 
the related tendencies against them to be displaced. 
V. THE ATTITUDE OF SUSPENDED CONCLUSION EXPLAINED 
To restate from the introduction, “[T]he most important factor in 
the training of good mental habits consists in acquiring the attitude of 
suspended conclusion . . . .”85 Later in How We Think, Dewey restates 
this fundamental premise the following way: 
The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment; and the es-
sence of this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature of the prob-
lem before proceeding to attempts at its solution. This, more than 
                                                                                                             
Martorella, supra note 78, at 90; see also Rand, supra note 73, at 749 (“An understanding of how the 
human mind actually processes information has enormous implications for legal education and prac-
tice.”). 
 83. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 17. 
 84. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 26. 
 85. Id. at 13. 
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any other thing, transforms mere inference into tested inference, 
suggested conclusions into proof.86 
It is an attitude of pause and patience.87 The attitude of suspended con-
clusion embraces doubt, accepts confusion and anxiety, examines alter-
native suggestions, overcomes impatience and habitual tendencies to 
rush toward an answer, and otherwise avoids the impulsive tendencies 
toward a premature conclusion before adequate reasoning.88 Just as law-
yers are often told that they should not be “conclusory” in their writing 
or oral advocacy,89 so too should they avoid being conclusory in their 
thinking. 
As stated previously, the utility of this attitude may seem obvious, 
but such things can seem so obvious that our failure to take the time to 
reflect on them leaves them ignored.90 We must unpeel the obviousness 
of the attitude to understand its rich core and see the tendencies that rot 
its practice, allowing us to develop a valuable art and discipline in the 
thinking process. 
The attitude of suspended conclusion is outcome-neutral. Dewey’s 
work explores how we think and, in that process, recognizes certain atti-
tudes and habits of thinking. As stated earlier, even though part of De-
wey’s ultimate project is to explain how to think, that is not the focus of 
this Article.91 
This Part fully explains the attitude of suspended conclusion. It be-
gins with an introduction about Dewey’s thoughts on attitude. Next is an 
analysis of the attitude of suspended conclusion according to the defini-
                                                 
 86. Id. at 74. 
 87. John Georgeoff, Man or Automaton, 44 PEABODY J. EDUC. 143, 143 (1966) (“When signif-
icant problems arise . . . a rational man pauses first to think and then to act.”). 
 88. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 14–15 (“Instead of being pushed into a mode of action by the 
sheer urgency of forces, whether instincts or habits, of which he is not aware, a reflective agent is 
drawn (to some extent at least) to action by some remoter object of which he is indirectly aware.”); 
see also Miller & Charles, supra note 62, at 202 (“The central aspect of critical reasoning is the 
commitment and ability to be persuaded by reasons rather than by personality, prejudice, power, 
chance, or other factors.”). 
 89. See, e.g., BRADLEY G. CLARY & PAMELA LYSAGHT, SUCCESSFUL LEGAL ANALYSIS AND 
WRITING: THE FUNDAMENTALS 102 (2d ed. 2006) (“[A]void exaggeration through conclusory mod-
ifiers . . . .”); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 226 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“[C]onclusory . . . describes a statement that puts forth a conclusion but not the reasoning behind 
it.”). 
 90. Green, supra note 15, at 85–86 (When dealing with the ordinary or obvious, “we are at risk 
of thinking [they are] mundane and uninteresting,” and “[t]he ordinary, that is, what is shared, is also 
commonly what is nearest at hand and therefore most likely to be overlooked. The ordinary ordinari-
ly goes unnoticed.”). 
 91. See supra Parts II–III. See also John Baillie, The Psychological Point of View, 39 PHIL. 
REV. 258, 260–61 (1930) (recognizing that humans have “a desire to have our minds cleared up as to 
how we are in the habit of thinking,” while explaining the need to understand the difference between 
“how we think” and “how to think”). 
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tions of the terms. This Part then covers what Dewey calls “reflective 
thought,” which, most important to this Article, requires embracing 
doubt, perplexity, or confusion and also requires turning things over in 
one’s mind. It moves on to examine the requirement that alternative ex-
planations be examined. Next, this Part explains that the attitude does not 
call for thought to an excessive degree, only to that which is necessary to 
fully think through a problem. Finally, it is noted that the attitude allows 
thinkers to free themselves from external influences that could lead to 
poor reflective thought. 
To Dewey, the presage that care must be taken in the conduct of 
thought could not be overstated.92 Thinking is an action word. Thought is 
meant to exercise the mind. Reaching an immediate conclusion exercises 
no thought—reaching a conclusion without postponed judgment involves 
no action and therefore cannot be said to be thought at all. As Parker cor-
rectly summarizes, “The rule about suspending judgment defines the 
general spirit that should prevail in the class and in the mind of each in-
quirer.”93 According to University of Michigan law professor James 
Boyd White, suspended conclusion puts “lead on your feet”94 to avoid 
quick judgment and helps one tap into the whole mind’s capacity to 
reach “excellence of judgment.”95 
The attitude of suspended conclusion deserves concentrated and fo-
cused attention. Although Dewey does not set forth a specific thesis of 
suspended conclusion, he does introduce its primacy and proceeds to 
provide valuable guidance to understanding its meaning throughout cer-
tain portions of How We Think. In fact, in 1922, Dewey described the 
primary and practical pedagogic aim of How We Think as counseling 
against the “premature acceptance and assertion of suggested meanings,” 
favoring the attitude of suspended conclusion because “[o]ne of the 
marks of controlled thinking is postponement of such acceptance.”96 This 
                                                 
 92. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 19 (“If upon thought hang all deliberate activities and the uses we 
make of all of our other powers, Locke’s assertion that it is of the highest concernment that care 
should be taken of its conduct is a moderate statement.”) (citing JOHN LOCKE, OF THE CONDUCT OF 
THE UNDERSTANDING ¶ 1 (1881)). 
 93. Parker, Problem-Solving IV, supra note 18, at 265. 
 94. James Boyd White, Meaning in the Life of the Lawyer, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 763, 771 (1995–
1996) (quoting 3 DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: PARADISO 195 (John D. Sinclair trans., 
1948) (“Whenever you are uncertain, put lead on your feet, to make you slow to reach either Yes or 
No: for a quick judgment often takes the wrong way; and then the feelings bind the intellect.”). 
 95. Id. In the context of a lawyer’s professional responsibility and development through indi-
vidual experience, “excellence of judgment is the work of the whole mind, including the affections, 
including the capacity to suspend conclusion.” Id. 
 96. Dewey, Reflective Thought, supra note 3, at 31. In describing his book, Dewey wrote, 
[T]he text of How We Think, with its practical pedagogic aim, was especially concerned 
with enforcing the difference between un-critical and critical thinking. Now one of the 
most marked differences between poor thinking and good thinking is the former’s prema-
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Article collects Dewey’s thoughts related to the attitude in order to 
present it as an independent topic endorsed by Dewey and provides sup-
plemental argument on what it should mean to adopt an attitude, and em-
brace a discipline of, suspended conclusion in one’s approach to think-
ing. 
Surprisingly, there are very few analyses of Dewey’s attitude of 
suspended conclusion. In fact, during research conducted across discip-
lines for this Article, only a few articles were discovered that even men-
tion it, let alone discuss it in any detail. Where possible, the existing lite-
rature that discusses the phrase will be incorporated in this Article’s ex-
plication of the attitude. 
Dewey’s suspended conclusion concept is, of course, similar to var-
ious theories of critical thinking and heuristics explored across multiple 
disciplines. I will not examine the entire field of such research in this 
Article, but it is important to note how prominent critical thinking is in 
psychology, pedagogy, and law.97 No single definition of critical think-
ing exists.98 Nonetheless, there is utility in many disciplines falling with-
in that large umbrella.99 
Dewey describes the attitude and its states of doubt, confusion, and 
perplexity as creating an “alert, cautious, and thorough inquiry.”100 In 
describing the meaning of “reflection” as used in How We Think, Parker 
identifies the principal aim as a “desire to produce reflective problem-
solvers, not impulsive ones. To reflect means to turn the matter over in 
the mind, to view it from various angles, to consider carefully the various 
possibilities of solution.”101 The attitude of suspended conclusion de-
mands that thinkers approach problems without preordaining a conclu-
                                                                                                             
ture acceptance and assertion of suggested meanings. One of the marks of controlled 
thinking is postponement of such acceptance. 
Id. 
 97. Yanchar et al., supra note 46, at 265 (“The prominence of critical thinking in psychology, 
from college curricula and pedagogy to basic and applied research, is difficult to overestimate.”). 
 98. Id. at 266 (“It can hardly be doubted that critical thinking in psychology comes in many 
forms and that no single description could capture the variety and nuance with which it is exercised 
by instructors, researchers, and practitioners.”). As Yanchar opines, “[T]he long history of debate 
surrounding the meaning of critical thinking suggests that no approach is likely to be universally 
accepted or to provide sufficient resources for critical analysis across all fields and under all cir-
cumstances.” Id. at 269 (citation omitted). That recognition should not negate the utility of sus-
pended conclusion, which stands as an effective thinking discipline whether within or apart from the 
larger field. 
 99. Id. at 268 (“[O]ur conclusion in this regard does not necessarily negate the usefulness or 
applicability of any particular form of critical thinking, or of critical thinking per se . . . . [T]he theo-
retical background of any method, tool, or procedure is what makes it useful for a particular applica-
tion . . . .”). 
 100. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 62. 
 101. Samuel Chester Parker, Problem-Solving or Practice in Thinking I, 21 ELEMENTARY SCH. 
J. 16, 25 (1920) (paraphrasing Dewey). 
26 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1 
sion or impulsively reaching one. Only when conclusion is suspended is 
there space for the exploration of the subject at hand. Adopting sus-
pended conclusion as an attitude—a habit of mind—can help one over-
come tendencies that debilitate the mind. 
Several alternative phrases capture the meaning and spirit of the 
term suspended conclusion, including “reserving judgment,” “postponing 
judgment,” or “suspending judgment.” A logical starting point is to un-
derstand the definitions of the primary predicate terms at issue in sus-
pended conclusion. 
In relevant part, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “conclusion” as 
“[t]he end; the termination; the act of finishing or bringing to a close.”102 
And it defines “judgment” as “[t]he formation of an opinion or notion 
concerning some thing by exercising the mind upon it.”103 The sense of 
finality is clear in the definitions of each. Therefore, an attitude of sus-
pending conclusion must demand some resistance to ending a pursuit. A 
common definition of “conclusion” is further instructive because it antic-
ipates the prerequisite existence of a process, setting its meaning as 
“[t]he end, finish or termination of a speech, writing, etc. . . .”; “[t]he 
issue, the final result, outcome”; and “[t]he result of a discussion or ex-
amination of an issue; final resolution, decision, agreement.”104 If one 
must come to a conclusion, some movement prior to reaching must nec-
essarily precede it. 
To suspend, therefore, must mean to embrace a process and tempo-
rarily delay finality in one’s approach. Indeed, a priori, it demands the 
existence of an approach. In relevant part, Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines “suspend” as “[t]o interrupt; to cause to cease for a time; to post-
pone; to stay, delay, or hinder; to discontinue temporarily, but with an 
expectation or purpose of resumption.”105 A general usage dictionary 
tracks the same attributes of the term, defining “suspend” as “[p]ut to a 
stop, esp. temporarily; bring to a (temporary) stop; put in abeyance; 
make temporarily inactive . . .”; “Cease from the execution or perfor-
mance of, esp. temporarily . . .”; “defer, postpone”; and “delay the ac-
complishment of.”106 It does not mean to linger endlessly because the 
definition of “suspend” itself anticipates the sense of the temporary. It is 
not the avoidance of conclusion or rejection of ever reaching conclu-
sions, just the temporary suspension of a final decision with an expecta-
                                                 
 102. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 290 (6th ed. 1990). 
 103. Id. at 841. A common usage dictionary provides similar guidance by defining “judge-
ment” as “[t]he formation of an opinion or notion concerning something by exercising the mind on 
it . . . .” 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 71, at 1466. 
 104. 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 71, at 477. 
 105. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 102, at 1446. 
 106. 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 57, at 3128. 
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tion of some process or act or event occurring prior to the anticipated 
end. By combining the meaning of suspend with conclusion, we reveal 
that the prerequisite act in question is, essentially, thinking. Oddly 
enough, the dictionary’s approach to suspension itself directly ties the 
word “suspend” with its relevance to judgment or conclusion and with its 
connection to doubt, a concept of particular importance to Dewey’s 
usage of the term. The definition of the independent term “suspend” in-
cludes “[k]eep (one’s judgement) undetermined; refrain from forming 
(an opinion) or giving (assent) decisively”; “[s]uspend one’s judgement; 
[and] be in doubt.”107 Without suspension, a conclusion is just an end 
with no preceding process and consequently no preceding justification 
for it. 
One can basically understand the concept of suspended conclusion 
from these definitions. But to fully understand Dewey’s attitude of sus-
pended conclusion, one must understand his definition of reflective 
thought108 as opposed to other uses of the “reflective” adjective else-
where.109 Reflective thought means that a belief is accepted only after 
                                                 
 107. Id. 
 108. Dewey sometimes loosely uses the modifier “reflective” as his recognized habit was to be 
somewhat imprecise in terminology at times. Any reader of Dewey must be cognizant of the criti-
cisms regarding Dewey’s loose use of terms, lest one read too much into the various terms Dewey 
uses rather than focusing on what he means by them. Certain words, used by others as terms of art, 
were written by Dewey with no intention of fitting his language into some other commonly accepted 
expert definition of a term. Mendell explains: 
If Dewey had an ethics of terminology, it did not inspire him to be vigilant about the use 
of terms. Whether he calls his method and theory pragmatic, instrumental, logical, empir-
ical, experimental, historical, reflective intelligence, evolutionary, scientific, or experien-
tial depends on the period of his career we are looking at, and his contemporaneous 
mood. His tendency to use these terms interchangeably gets him into trouble with critics, 
who point to it as evidence of a looseness of thought . . . . So there was nothing sacred 
about any of his terms. 
Mendell, supra note 35, at 625–26 n.3 (emphasis added). Thus, one should be cautious and not over-
read Dewey’s terminology choices. In this sense, Dewey faced criticisms that his work was some-
times too simple. See Eugene G. Bugg, Book Review, 46 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 528, 528 (1934) (finding 
the book pedagogically valuable but critical of Dewey’s loose and imprecise use of terminology in 
How We Think). Dewey himself recognized that his terms, like inquiry and logic, did not fit well for 
purposes of comparison with others’ uses of the same terms. John Dewey, Logical Method, supra 
note 37, at 17–18 (“This definition [of logical theory] would be questioned by many authorities, and 
it is only fair to say that it does not represent the orthodox or the prevailing view.”). 
 109. Reflective thinking, as it will be discussed here and as used in Dewey’s passages relied on 
here, is meant in its strictest and narrowest meaning. Reflective thinking, as used, is different from 
reflective methods, reflective learning or reflective practice, and other permutations of the “reflec-
tive” adjective. All uses in this Article relate only to the meaning of thinking itself, not to the learn-
ing or practice methods or experiential thinking matters that some other writers attach to the term. 
For an examination of the variety of ways that “reflective” is used in areas of learning and inquiry, 
see, for example, HANDBOOK OF REFLECTION AND REFLECTIVE INQUIRY: MAPPING A WAY OF 
KNOWING FOR PROFESSIONAL REFLECTIVE INQUIRY 2 (Nona Lyons ed., 2010) (“[T]his chapter 
presents . . . a linking of the major concepts of [Dewey, Schön, and Freire] on reflection and reflec-
28 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1 
“the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy 
to support the belief examined.”110 For the purposes of How We Think, 
Dewey states, “Thinking . . . is defined accordingly as that operation in 
which present facts suggest other facts (or truths) in such a way as to 
induce belief in the latter upon the ground or warrant of the former.”111 
The facts in a problem present suggested conclusions and provide the 
raw material for identifying and evaluating not just the first suggestion of 
a conclusion that comes to mind but also the alternatives to that first sug-
gestion. Dewey calls suspended conclusion vital to reflective thinking. 
When faced with a problem to be solved, thinkers must discipline 
themselves to mechanize and make operationally effective the attitude of 
suspended conclusion. Dewey proceeds to describe the necessary, “five 
logically distinct steps” in reflective thinking: 
(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of 
possible solution; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of 
the suggestion; (v) further observation and experiment leading to its 
acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbe-
lief.112 
These five steps form the framework within which the suspended conclu-
sion concept operates. 
Adopting an attitude of suspended conclusion is the first (and ne-
cessary) principle of reflective thinking without which true thinking 
could not exist.113 As to the first step, suspended conclusion itself is the 
state necessary to create the “felt difficulty.” The difficulty must exist in 
terms of doubt, confusion, or perplexity. And if these states do not exist, 
i.e., are not “felt,” one must alter the state of mind and induce those feel-
ings. If one is immediately at ease with a problem and its solution, one is 
likely not engaging in any critical analysis. The second step involves lo-
cating where the difficulty lies within the problem. The third step in-
volves identifying one suggestion of a conclusion—perhaps the first 
guess, the gut or intuitive feeling. One cannot proceed directly toward 
defending a conclusion based only on that first suggestion of a conclu-
                                                                                                             
tive inquiry to form a new interconnected whole.”); DONALD S. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE 
PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983). 
110. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 1–2. Dewey states it more concisely in the 1933 edition: 
[R]eflective thinking, in distinction from other operations to which we apply the name of 
thought, involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which 
thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that 
will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity. 
DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 12. 
 111. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 8–9 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 72. 
 113. Id. at 1–2. 
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sion. Instead, the thinker must proceed to steps four and five, which in-
volve the relative validity of the suggestion that can be accomplished 
only through the identification and evaluation of rival (or alternative) 
suggestions—multiple candidates vying to be the winning conclusion. 
When Dewey further breaks down these five steps in the reflective 
process, he describes two categories that emerge from an initial accep-
tance and adoption of the attitude: 
Further consideration at once reveals certain subprocesses which are 
involved in every reflective operation. These are: (a) a state of per-
plexity, hesitation, doubt; and (b) an act of search or investigation 
directed toward bringing to light further facts which serve to corro-
borate or to nullify the suggested belief.114 
Subprocess (a) correlates with steps one through three above, while sub-
process (b) correlates with steps four and five from above. Suspended 
conclusion puts one in the situation described in (a)—the state of per-
plexity about the answer, hesitation before conclusion, and doubt or 
questioning that eliminates immediate confidence in the superiority of 
one conclusion over other possible alternatives. It is the initial non-
acceptance of the first suggested conclusion. Doubt must be embraced to 
create a “controversy within the mind” that then requires alternatives 
analysis where “[d]ifferent sides compete for a conclusion in their fa-
vor.”115 By starting with doubt, perplexity, or confusion, an individual 
can search for understandings that connect possible answers to questions 
rather than presuming one already knows the answer.116 To reach a final 
conclusion then, one must engage in the activities described in (b)—a 
                                                 
 114. Id. at 9. 
 115. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 121. Dewey’s full statement in this regard is helpful: 
Unless there is something doubtful, the situation is read off at a glance; it is taken on in 
sight; i.e., there is merely perception, recognition, not judgment. If the matter is wholly 
doubtful, if it is dark and obscure throughout, there is a blind mystery and again no judg-
ment occurs. But if it suggests, however vaguely, different meanings, rival possible inter-
pretations, there is some point at issue, some matter at stake. Doubt takes the form of 
discussion, of controversy within the mind. Different sides compete for a conclusion in 
their favor. 
Id.  
 116. Pauli instructs on this utility of confusion: 
For any individual the key to successful problem solving lies in his attitude toward confu-
sion . . . . The first step in overcoming confusion is to acquire a realistic attitude toward 
it. Part of this attitude is a skepticism of all approaches to problem solving which purport 
to be clear and simple . . . . Shortcuts through dense forests are sometimes necessary, but 
if the necessary is understanding of the forest, shortcuts will enable us to see the least. In 
learning, our objective is not merely to reach a specific goal, an answer which can be 
found in a book or which someone can tell us, but to attain understanding of the relation-
ships which connect the answer to the question. 
Pauli, supra note 55, at 82. 
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thorough and searching analysis of the data and alternatives to the first 
suggested conclusion.117 
On the meaning of a felt difficulty and the importance of sugges-
tion, Dewey explains that conclusions do not emerge out of spontaneous 
combustion from the data provided but instead must come from the anal-
ysis of the suggestions the data evokes: 
We may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is some 
perplexity, confusion, or doubt. Thinking is not a case of spontane-
ous combustion; it does not occur just on “general principles.” 
There is something specific which occasions and evokes 
it . . . . Given a difficulty, the next step is suggestion of some way 
out—the formation of some tentative plan or project, the entertain-
ing of some theory which will account for the peculiarities in ques-
tion, the consideration of some solution for the problem. The data at 
hand cannot supply the solution; they can only suggest it.118 
Within each true problem or question posed is the definition of an end to 
be achieved, but that problem or question presents a perplexity to be re-
solved through thought and is not meant to itself be the suggestion of an 
immediate conclusion.119 It is this perplexity that opens the mind. 
Similarly, an attitude of suspended conclusion also requires that one 
embrace confusion. The confused mind is superior because it is open to 
alternative suggestions. If one is not confused at the outset of a problem 
or question, one must wonder whether the absence of confusion is the 
result of a closed mind. Where confusion does not exist immediately, it 
                                                 
 117. Parker outlines the educator’s approach to the attitude of suspended conclusion as follows, 
explaining that a teacher should 
[e]ncourage pupils to evaluate suggestions carefully by getting them (a) to “maintain the 
state of doubt,” i.e., to delay their final conclusion and to remain open-minded until the 
matter is finally proved; (b) to criticize thoroughly all suggestions, i.e., to anticipate men-
tally objections that might be made to them or consequences that might follow; (c) to ve-
rify suggestions and conclusions by reference to facts as revealed around them or in mi-
niature experiments or in standard scientific treatises . . . . Avoid pugnacious stubborn ar-
gument. 
Parker, Problem-Solving IV, supra note 18, at 265. These are the implementation steps necessary to 
execute suspended conclusion from the beginning of an analysis to an adopted alternative at the end. 
 118. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 12; DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 15 (making the same argument 
with only incidental differences). 
 119. Dewey explains: 
Demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guiding factor in the entire 
process of reflection . . . . But a question to be answered, an ambiguity to be resolved, 
sets up an end and holds the current of ideas to a definite channel. Every suggested con-
clusion is tested by its reference to this regulating end, by its pertinence to the problem in 
hand. This need of straightening out a perplexity also controls the kind of inquiry under-
taken . . . . The problem fixes the end of thought and the end controls the process of 
thinking. 
DEWEY, supra note 1, at 11–12 (emphasis omitted). 
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should be artificially injected. William Pauli defines confusion as “the 
sense of a discomfiture of mind, a state of being disconcerted, of expe-
riencing perplexity, doubt, and uncertainty.”120 When used in that sense, 
confusion is synonymous with the initial thinking position—the state of 
suspended conclusion—proposed for adoption here and by Dewey. Pauli 
explains the ubiquitous nature of confusion in problem-solving: “The 
process of thinking, of solving problems, of discovering identical and 
related elements in seemingly unrelated and different situations is the 
process of overcoming confusion.”121 Accepting confusion is not easy, 
but problems are not typically susceptible to clear and simple processes 
or directly ascertainable solutions that can be gleaned from a book. 
Dewey’s apt phrase for the action initiated by adopting an attitude 
of suspended conclusion is “turn[ing] the thing over in mind.”122 Anxiety 
and mental uneasiness can be easily but inappropriately quelled by im-
pulsive and immediate conclusion. But instead of seeking comfort from 
these afflictions, they must be accepted, indeed embraced, if one is to 
engage in good thinking: 
If the suggestion that occurs is at once accepted, we have uncritical 
thinking, the minimum of reflection. To turn the thing over in mind, 
to reflect, means to hunt for additional evidence, for new data, that 
will develop the suggestion, and will either, as we say, bear it out or 
else make obvious its absurdity and irrelevance. Given a genuine 
difficulty and a reasonable amount of analogous experience to draw 
upon, the difference, par excellence, between good and bad thinking 
is found at this point. The easiest way is to accept any suggestion 
that seems plausible and thereby bring to an end the condition of 
mental uneasiness.123 
In a 2009 article, U.S. District Court Judge Kravitz adds credibility to 
this view when citing Dewey’s philosophy on “turning things over” in 
his discipline as a judge during oral arguments—rejecting predisposi-
tion.124 As Judge Kravitz states, “[R]eflection equates with consideration 
of reasoned discourse . . . . That is how I use oral argument—to turn a 
case, or an issue, upside down and over and over again, hoping to see its 
                                                 
 120. Pauli, supra note 55, at 81. 
 121. Id. 
 122. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 13. 
 123. Id.; see also DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 3 (“[R]eflective thinking [is] thinking that 
consists in turning a subject over in the mind and giving it serious and consecutive consideration.”). 
 124. Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A District 
Judge’s Perspective on Their History, Function and Future, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 247, 271 
(2009). “[I]n our headlong, and not altogether inappropriate, rush toward judicial efficiency, we 
should not—indeed, we must not—forget the value of reflection and the role that oral argument can 
play in that most critical of all judicial endeavors.” Id. (citing DEWEY, supra note 1). 
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hidden side, to ensure that I fully understand it and all of its implica-
tions.”125 
True judgment can occur only if preceded by holding an immedi-
ately available suggestion toward conclusion in suspense, viewing that 
suggestion as a perplexity for examination rather than accepting it as a 
conclusion for advancement. Dewey explains: 
If this meaning is at once accepted, there is no reflective thinking, 
no genuine judging. Thought is cut short uncritically; dogmatic be-
lief, with all its attending risks, takes place. But if the meaning sug-
gested is held in suspense, pending examination and inquiry, there 
is true judgment. We stop and think, we de-fer conclusion in order 
to in-fer more thoroughly. In this process of being only condition-
ally accepted, accepted only for examination, meanings become 
ideas. That is to say, an idea is a meaning that is tentatively enter-
tained, formed, and used with reference to its fitness to decide a 
perplexing situation—a meaning used as a tool of judgment.126 
A ground for belief in a conclusion must be established before it is ac-
cepted.127 
Dewey describes the reflective process like a “forked-road situa-
tion . . . which is ambiguous, which presents a dilemma, which proposes 
alternatives” when reached by the “perplexed wayfarer.”128 The wayfarer 
cannot choose a path until after pausing for a moment to look down and 
survey from above the landscape surrounding any problem and the mul-
tiple elements moving, surrounding, and interacting within it.129 Sus-
pended conclusion, then, is like climbing a tree to take a look around and 
analyze the alternative paths—considering the options and opposition.130 
When perched over the surface of a problem within the attitude of 
suspended conclusion, confusion is a good thing—the ground below 
suggests many things, and it takes time to bring it into focus. It should be 
                                                 
 125. Id. 
 126. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 108. 
 127. Id. at 8 (“Reflection thus implies that something is believed in (or disbelieved in), not on 
its own direct account, but through something else which stands as witness, evidence, proof, vouch-
er, warrant; that is, as ground of belief.”). 
 128. Id. at 10–11 (emphasis omitted). As Patrick Wiseman describes it, 
If there’s more than one rule applicable to a particular fact, you’ve reached a fork in the 
road. Take it, i.e., apply the one rule and follow where it leads you. Then apply the other 
rule and see if it leads you somewhere different. You are essentially constructing a deci-
sion tree with every branch made explicit. 
Patrick Wiseman, “When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It,” and Other Sage Advice for 
First-Time Law School Exam Takers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 662 (2006). 
 129. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 11 (“In the suspense of uncertainty, we metaphorically climb a 
tree; we try to find some standpoint from which we may survey additional facts and, getting a more 
commanding view of the situation, may decide how the facts stand related to one another.”). 
 130. Id. 
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embraced. One should begin the process of addressing a problem with at 
least an appearance of confusion and uncertainty as to its result. Other-
wise, one is not suspending conclusion but instead observing the problem 
while leaning toward a predetermined result, and is thus likely to miss 
alternative conclusions or suggestions that must be explored before hav-
ing any true confidence in the ultimate conclusion. As Patricia King and 
Karen Kitchener describe it, the reflective thinking involved in accepting 
uncertainty of a conclusion at the start and engaging in analysis thereaf-
ter leads to a situation of closure where “[t]he resulting judgments are 
offered as reasonable integrations or syntheses of opposing points of 
view.”131 
Although he does not examine suspended conclusion in any detail, 
Richard Neumann has described the forked-road situation that Dewey 
uses to explain the perplexity of a problem as requiring a form of discip-
lined curiosity: 
Diagnostic and predictive judgments both rest on the same habits of 
thought: recognizing what John Dewey called a “forked-road situa-
tion . . . that is ambiguous, that presents a dilemma, that proposes 
alternatives”; developing and testing the largest number of reasona-
ble hypothesized alternatives in ways that efficiently link those al-
ternatives to concrete, clarifying information while avoiding prema-
ture judgment; wondering—in light of what is already known—
what else could also be true and then testing any relevant hypothes-
es so discovered; aggressively seeking information from the largest 
practical variety of sources; refusing to guess, assume, or be satis-
fied with appearances; recognizing patterns in events and interrela-
tionships among ideas; and identifying the concept that explains a 
situation’s essence. Diagnosis and prediction thus depend on the pa-
radox of disciplined curiosity. The curiosity arises from a kind of 
chaotic openness that Dewey called “the spirit of wonder,” and the 
                                                 
 131. PATRICIA M. KING & KAREN STROHM KITCHENER, DEVELOPING REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT: 
UNDERSTANDING AND PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL GROWTH AND CRITICAL THINKING IN 
ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS 7 (1994). King and Kitchener summarize Dewey’s concept as follows: 
According to Dewey, a person makes a judgment, what he called a reflective judgment, 
to bring closure to situations that are uncertain. In such uncertain or problematic situa-
tions, there is no way to apply a formula to derive a correct solution and no way to prove 
definitively that a proposed solution is correct . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he problem solver engaged in reflective thinking must evaluate the potential solu-
tions to the problem in light of existing information, information that may be incomplete 
and unverifiable . . . . Reflective thinking requires the continual evaluation of beliefs, as-
sumptions, and hypotheses against existing data and against other plausible interpreta-
tions of the data. The resulting judgments are offered as reasonable integrations or syn-
theses of opposing points of view. 
Id. at 6–7. 
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discipline from a very practical and opposite tendency, which De-
wey called “organization of the means required to realize an 
end.”132 
Neumann’s characterization of this disciplined curiosity, as one can see, 
generally captures some essentials of the attitude of suspended conclu-
sion and is useful to our understanding of it.133 
Suggestions of a conclusion are introduced in thinking about a 
question or problem, and they must be tested before being accepted.134 
Therefore, a necessary part of the process that follows suspension of 
conclusion must be the search for and consideration of rival alternative 
arguments and suggested conclusions: 
The suggested conclusion so far as it is not accepted but only tenta-
tively entertained constitutes an idea . . . . Since suspended belief, or 
the postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence, 
depends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures as to the best 
course to pursue or the probable explanation to favor, cultivation of 
a variety of alternative suggestions is an important factor in good 
thinking.135 
When individuals become fixated on finding the answer, they tune out 
the nuances—they fail to find the proper frequency. 
The consideration of rival suggestions lies at the heart of the atti-
tude of suspended conclusion. Without them, the attitude is empty in op-
eration. As Dewey explains, one must examine alternative or rival hypo-
theses to “prevent[] [one] from dogmatically accepting the first sugges-
tion” so that “[j]udgment is held in suspense and a positive conclusion 
postponed.”136 The alternative-suggestions approach should be adopted 
by the prudent thinker. The effective implementation of the attitude of 
suspended conclusion demands that the thinker explore all sides of an 
argument, all positions of all interested parties, and all potentially appli-
cable doctrines (e.g., majority and minority rules) in the scenario pre-
                                                 
 132. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 725, 746–47 (1989) [hereinafter Neumann, Preliminary Inquiry] (quoting DEWEY 1933, supra 
note 1). 
 133. Dewey is not the focus of Neumann’s article and where he does treat Dewey’s theories, 
Neumann is focused more on Dewey’s theories of logic, the means of critique, and experiential 
learning than on the subject of this Article. 
 134. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 30 (“Thinking involves (as we have seen) the suggestion of a 
conclusion for acceptance, and also, a search or inquiry to test the value of the suggestion before 
finally accepting it.”). 
 135. Id. at 75. 
 136. Id. at 82. 
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sented.137 Whenever there are rival rules, theories, arguments, sugges-
tions, or conclusions, a struggle must ensue before a conclusion is 
reached. 
The thinker should proceed to compare and contrast the rivals or al-
ternatives. Dewey explains the importance of that process: 
Comparison, without contrast, does not amount to anything logical-
ly . . . . Unless, in short, the observer takes care to have the differ-
ences in the observed cases as extreme as conditions allow, and un-
less he notes unlikenesses as carefully as likenesses, he has no way 
of determining the evidential force of the data that confront him. 
Another way of bringing out this importance of unlikeness is the 
emphasis put by the scientist upon negative cases—upon instances 
which it would seem ought to fall into line but which as matter of 
fact do not. Anomalies, exceptions, things which agree in most re-
spects but disagree in some crucial point, are so important that 
many of the devices of scientific technique are designed purely to 
detect, record, and impress upon memory contrasting cases. Darwin 
remarked that so easy is it to pass over cases that oppose a favorite 
generalization, that he had made it a habit not merely to hunt for 
contrary instances, but also to write down any exception he noted or 
thought of—as otherwise it was almost sure to be forgotten.138 
Remember that one can never compare and contrast if one does not first 
identify alternative conclusions, again illustrating that the task of alterna-
tive analysis ipso facto cannot exist unless and until conclusion is sus-
pended. 
Kathryn Stanchi makes some similar observations when discussing 
two-sided analysis from the perspective of persuasion and the passionate 
and zealous advocate, along with the debate on the duties or utilities of 
disclosure of negative information in the adversarial process. As Stanchi 
states, “Confronting and defusing negative information is a critical aspect 
of the art of persuasion”139 in part “because ‘[t]he weight of an argumen-
tative position can be properly gauged only by reference to what can be 
set against it.’”140 Stanchi concludes: 
                                                 
 137. Dewey, Reflective Thought, supra note 3, at 36 (“If one hypothesis is good because it 
starts one train of deductive implications and initiates one set of experiments, several are better 
because they extend the operation. In any complicated case, it would be practically impossible to 
arrive at a sound conclusion save as various deductive systems were compared and the results of 
different experiments used to check one another.”). 
 138. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 89–90. 
 139. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing With Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in 
Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381, 381 (2008). 
 140. Id. at 388 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Arguing the Law: The Advocate’s Duty and 
Opportunity, 16 GA. L. REV. 821, 828 (1982)); see also McElroy & Coughlin, supra note 4, at 230 
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The data demonstrate that two-sided refutational messages consis-
tently, and across a wide spectrum of variables, were more effec-
tive, in that they resulted in more sustained attitude-change that was 
less vulnerable to opposing arguments. This data . . . demonstrates 
that the power of a message is stronger if it confronts and refutes its 
weaknesses . . . . 
In terms of message style, the studies show a distinct advantage for 
a message that directly and frankly deals with negative informa-
tion.141 
Stanchi focuses on persuasion as an advocate and does not focus on 
the importance of alternative analysis from the perspective of the dispas-
sionate problem-solver, but her analysis on the importance of under-
standing and anticipating opposition arguments is equally applicable in 
that latter setting. After fully explaining the arguments available to all 
sides and the alternative conclusions through the process of comparing 
and contrasting those arguments and conclusions, lawyers should assess 
the strength and likelihood of success of each and be sure that they have 
fully developed the argument for the choice of one over the other. 
Professors Lisa McElroy and Christine Coughlin make similar 
points regarding the importance of considering “counter” arguments or 
alternative conclusions in legal analysis.142 They find that 
[s]ocial scientists have studied the theory of conceptual change, the 
corollary to counter-analysis in a non-legal context, and have rec-
ognized that this task involves the following steps: (1) thinking 
deeply about the alternative conception, (2) juxtaposing argument 
against the alternative, (3) explaining anomalous pieces of data, and 
(4) weighing issues and arguments. The process that allows a stu-
dent to engage in effective counter-analysis involves “deep 
processing, elaborative strategy use and significant meta-cognitive 
reflection.” 143
 
                                                                                                             
(“[T]he logically strongest overall conclusion ‘[requires students] to critically evaluate arguments 
and counterarguments’. . . . Specifically, it ‘enhances the “the writer’s credibility as an intelligent 
source of information.’”) (quoting E. Michael Nussbaum, Using Argumentation Ven Diagrams 
(AVDs) for Promoting Argument-Counterargument Integration in Reflective Writing, 100 J. EDUC. 
PSYCHOL. 549, 550 (2008); MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND 
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 174 n.12 (2d ed. 2008)). 
 141. Stanchi, supra note 139, at 424 (citations omitted). 
 142. See genrally McElroy & Coughlin, supra note 4. 
 143. Id. at 230–31 (quoting E. Michael Nussbaum & Gale M. Sinatra, Argument and Concep-
tual Engagement, 28 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 384, 385 (2003)). McElroy and Coughlin rely on 
several other useful sources for their exploration on the importance of counteranalysis, including E. 
Michael Nussbaum & CarolAnne M. Kardash, The Effects of Goal Instructions and Text on the 
Generation of Counterarguments During Writing, 97 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 157 (2005); Nussbaum, 
supra note 140, at 550 (“Effective argumentation also involves metacognitive reflection, a ‘stepping 
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One limitation of the McElroy and Coughlin study is that it starts 
from the standpoint of “argument” and the means of “persuasion,” along 
with the utility of “counterargument” to make one’s position stronger, 
rather than seeking to suspend conclusion with a completely open mind 
as to the desired conclusion. 
A theory very similar to suspended conclusion—at least in relation 
to its focus on alternatives analysis—is what has been termed “critical 
dialogue” or “dialogical reasoning.”144 Yanchar described the benefits of 
such reasoning in a discussion regarding comparative assumptions be-
tween competing arguments: 
This recommendation emphasizes the need to become aware of 
one’s own assumptions and those of others through a type of critical 
conversation with those whose work represents an alternative pers-
pective and is informed by alternative assumptions. This dialogical 
activity can be particularly helpful in identifying and evaluating 
one’s own assumptions and values that are not explicitly recog-
nized. As some have argued, those with different perspectives are 
often able to identify what an individual takes for granted and thus 
cannot easily discern about their own viewpoints and projects. In-
deed, by virtue of what may be termed a “clash of divergent 
views”—or a form of dialogical comparison and contrast—the 
meaning and implications of an assumptive framework can become 
apparent, or at least a little clearer to those who hold it.145 
By engaging in dialogue, one is required to critically evaluate the 
chosen position, listen to opposing views, and reconsider the original 
position in that light. “Given the opacity of many theoretical assump-
tions, we view such dialogue [as] essential to adequate critical think-
ing.”146 It requires one to accept the potential fallibility of the original 
position selected and remain open to criticism. It only works, however, if 
one is humble and in a position to listen and engage in the dialogue.147 If 
                                                                                                             
back’ that allows one to view and weigh the overall merits of different arguments and counterargu-
ments.”) (citation omitted). 
 144. Yanchar et al., supra note 46, at 273 (citing RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND 
OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); HANS-GEORG 
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (2d ed. 1989); FRANK C. RICHARDSON ET AL., RE-ENVISIONING 
PSYCHOLOGY: MORAL DIMENSIONS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE (1999); Karl Hostetler, Community 
and Neutrality in Critical Thought: A Nonobjectivist View on the Conduct and Teaching of Critical 
Thinking, in RE-THINKING REASON: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN CRITICAL THINKING 135 (Kerry S. Wal-
ters ed., 1994); Brent Slife, Testing the Limits of Henriques’ Proposal: Wittgensteinian Lessons and 
Hermeneutic Dialogue, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 107 (2005)). 
 145. Id. at 273–74 (quoting Hostetler, supra note 144, at 143). 
 146. Id. at 274. 
 147. Id. (“[T]hrough this dialogical encounter, one can become more aware of another’s view-
point and assumptions, which raises the possibility of attaining new understandings and engaging in 
new forms of practice that may prove beneficial over time.”). 
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one adopts “a type of humility about one’s own position,” it “increases 
the likelihood of engaging in a genuine dialogue about its strengths and 
weaknesses in comparison to those of others.”148 
Moreover, understanding the opposing argument has independent 
utility. As Yanchar posits, although individuals “may or may not revise 
their prior assumptions as a result of critical dialogical encounters 
marked by care, respect, and humility, they can better understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of their own positions and achieve new under-
standings that broaden their appreciation for others.”149 The dialogue it-
self sets the stage for the type of comparing and contrasting between al-
ternative positions that an attitude of suspended conclusion demands.150 
One cannot help but see, as Dewey himself did, the similarities be-
tween the attitude of suspended conclusion and the role of a trial court.151 
The attitude of suspended conclusion indeed replicates the ideal that is 
sought after in a neutral system of justice and the concept of a “fair trial.” 
For example, Dewey discussed the judge’s appropriate temperament as 
including “a willingness to hold final selection in suspense,” where 
“[a]lertness, flexibility, curiosity are the essentials; dogmatism, rigidity, 
prejudice, caprice, arising from routine, passion, and flippancy are fa-
tal.”152 After all, the condition and consideration of the judge are often 
the images most immediately evoked by use of the term judgment. 
Dewey explained: 
[T]he course of inference goes on through a series of partial and 
tentative judgments. What are these units, these terms of inference 
when we examine them on their own account? Their significant 
                                                 
 148. Id. (citation omitted). 
 149. Id. 
150. [R]esearchers [should] seek to understand as thoroughly as possible the assumptions 
that inform their theories and methods and, moreover, those that inform alternatives. 
Such understanding can facilitate a type of comparison and contrast that clarifies the 
meaning of theories and methods and leaves researchers in a better position to adopt 
those most suitable for their purposes. 
Id. at 270. 
 151. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 102 (“Cases brought to trial before a judge illustrate neatly and 
unambiguously this strife of alternative interpretations; but any case of trying to clear up intellectu-
ally a doubtful situation exemplifies the same traits.”); DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 121 (slightly 
changing his wording but making essentially the same assertion). 
 152. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 105–06; see also Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: 
Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004) [hereinafter 
Simon, A Third View] (“Judges and other fact finders may shun[] cognitively complex and difficult 
decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong, confident conclusions.”); cf. 
Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 104 (1998) 
[hereinafter Simon, Psychological Model] (“Dewey stated that decision making does not flow from 
premises to conclusions, but is rather a continuous process in which premises gradually emerge from 
analysis of the ‘total situation.’”) (quoting Dewey, Logical Method, supra note 37, at 23). 
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traits may be readily gathered from a consideration of the operations 
to which the word judgment was originally applied: namely, the au-
thoritative decision of matters in legal controversy—the procedure 
of the judge on the bench. There are three such features: (1) a con-
troversy, consisting of opposite claims regarding the same objective 
situation; (2) a process of defining and elaborating these claims and 
of sifting the facts adduced to support them; (3) a final decision, or 
sentence, closing the particular matter in dispute and also serving as 
a rule or principle for deciding future cases.153 
A trial requires all participants—judges, parties, and counsel—to 
sift through the facts and select the rules. Judgment in a trial then in-
volves collecting relevant data, examining suggestions made from that 
data (facts and law), identifying what is or is not significant or relevant to 
the question at issue, and weighing alternative claims and suggestions.154 
The attitude of suspended conclusion, although similar to the men-
tality of a trial judge, need not be limited to that particular exercise. In 
many ways, judgment in a legal sense is not peculiar or unique. Consider 
Dewey’s example of the attitude as it applies to a physician who “sus-
pends—postpones—reaching a conclusion in order that he may not be 
led by superficial occurrences into a snap judgment”:155 
Imagine a doctor called in to prescribe for a patient. The patient tells 
him some things that are wrong; his experienced eye, at a glance, 
takes in other signs of a certain disease. But if he permits the sug-
gestion of this special disease to take possession prematurely of his 
mind, to become an accepted conclusion, his scientific thinking is 
by that much cut short. A large part of his technique, as a skilled 
practitioner, is to prevent the acceptance of the first suggestions that 
arise; even, indeed, to postpone the occurrence of any very definite 
suggestion till the trouble—the nature of the problem—has been 
thoroughly explored. In the case of a physician this proceeding is 
known as diagnosis, but a similar inspection is required in every 
                                                 
 153. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 101–02. 
 154. Dewey describes these predicates to judgment in a trial in the following manner: 
The hearing of the controversy, the trial, i.e. the weighing of alternative claims, divides 
into two branches, either of which, in a given case, may be more conspicuous than the 
other. In the consideration of a legal dispute, these two branches are sifting the evidence 
and selecting the rules that are applicable; they are “the facts” and “the law” of the case. 
In judgment they are (a) the determination of the data that are important in the given 
case . . . and (b) the elaboration of the conceptions or meanings suggested by the crude 
data . . . . (a) What portions or aspects of the situation are significant in controlling the 
formation of the interpretation? (b) Just what is the full meaning and bearing of the con-
ception that is used as a method of interpretation? These questions are strictly correlative; 
the answer to each depends upon the answer to the other. 
Id. at 102–03. 
 155. Id. at 85. 
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novel and complicated situation to prevent rushing to a conclu-
sion.156 
The utility and wisdom of suspended conclusion are universally applica-
ble to assessing problems presented, regardless of the occupational task. 
An understandable criticism of the suspended conclusion concept is 
that it can lead to decision-avoidance or be used to justify procrastina-
tion.157 As properly understood, it should not. Complications may occur 
where the number of suggestions is too few and where the number is too 
many.158 Thus, it is important to emphasize that an attitude of suspended 
conclusion must be tempered with the reality and necessity of reaching a 
conclusion at some reasonable point. For example, Professor David Su-
per warns about a legal culture of procrastination in “[c]ontemporary 
legal thinking . . . . We obsess about avoiding decisions without all poss-
ible relevant information while ignoring the costs of postponing deci-
sions until that information becomes available. We valorize procrastina-
tion and condemn investments of decisional resources in early deci-
sions.”159 Super is explaining governmental decision-making from insti-
tutional motivations and constituent demands, and describes the conflict 
between unduly decisive behavior and unduly delayed decision-
making.160 His article is enlightening in its description of unduly post-
poning decisions, tending toward decision-avoidance and delaying deci-
sions while waiting for new or additional information.161 At some point, 
reality dictates an ending point to doubt. That is especially true when 
                                                 
 156. Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
 157. For an examination of varying theories of procrastination, see, e.g., Dan Ariely & Klaus 
Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 219 (2002); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 
Q.J. ECON. 121 (2001); Dianne M. Tice & Roy F. Baumeister, Logitudinal Study of Procrastination, 
Performance, Stress, and Health: The Costs and Benefits of Dawdling, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 454 (1997). 
 158. Dewey explains these “flood” and “trickle” difficulties: 
We speak truly, in some cases, of the flood of suggestions; in others, there is but a slender 
trickle . . . . 
. . . . 
A conclusion reached after consideration of a few alternatives may be formally correct, 
but it will not possess the fullness and richness of meaning of one arrived at after compar-
ison of a greater variety of alternative suggestions. On the other hand, suggestions may be 
too numerous and too varied for the best interests of mental habit. So many suggestions 
may rise that the person is at a loss to select among them . . . . So much suggests itself 
pro and con, one thing leads on to another so naturally, that he finds it difficult to decide 
in practical affairs or to conclude in matters of theory. 
DEWEY, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
 159. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming Sept. 2011), 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1988&context= 
fac_pubs. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. 
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there is a need for the best conclusion possible within a time or other re-
source constraint. 
The attitude of suspended conclusion anticipates action toward 
conclusion whereas avoidance, procrastination, and indecision anticipate 
inaction or action away from conclusion. Dewey explained in How We 
Think that “[t]he disciplined, or logically trained, mind—the aim of the 
educative process—is the mind able to judge how far each of these steps 
needs to be carried in any particular situation,” and is able to judge when 
to stop and reach a conclusion or when to continue with the reflective 
process.162 “What is important is that the mind should be sensitive to 
problems and skilled in methods of attack and solution.”163 Elsewhere, 
Dewey responded to some criticisms of the attitude of suspended conclu-
sion, explaining that it should not be seen as an endorsement for deci-
sion-avoidance or perpetual indecision: “It is far from being true . . . that 
conclusion is postponed till the problem is solved. We accept or adopt at 
every point. The difference is in the conditions and purpose of the accep-
tance . . . .”164 It is perfectly acceptable to reach conclusions after reflec-
tion; it is only unacceptable to begin with conclusions and thereby sub-
vert the processes of thought. 
Thus, there is a necessity in the real world to, at some point, reach a 
conclusion—to end the suspension. As Dewey acknowledged, “There is 
such a thing as too much thinking, as when action is paralyzed by the 
multiplicity of views suggested by a situation . . . . The best mental habit 
involves a balance between paucity and redundancy of suggestions.”165 
Knowing when to do so is necessarily a matter of judgment, and the 
guidance on that judgment is outside the purview of this Article. From 
the foregoing, it can at least be contended that, though one may practice 
an attitude of suspended conclusion without being in perpetual doubt, 
conclusion cannot occupy the first position in the thinking process lest 
thinking itself be left out of the race. 
Finally, the attitude of suspended conclusion is, according to De-
wey, about escape from arbitrary constraints on the freedom of the mind, 
such as impulsive tendencies and other undue internal and external influ-
ences against thought. The attitude of suspended conclusion relieves the 
thinker of the intolerable shackles of conclusion, where one is then set 
free to explore the “new materials to corroborate or to refute the first 
                                                 
 162. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 78. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Dewey, Reflective Thought, supra note 3, at 37 n.4. 
 165. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 36. 
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suggestions that occur.”166 As Dewey concluded, “Thought affords the 
sole method of escape from purely impulsive or purely routine action.”167 
Dewey described the attitude of suspended conclusion as a form of 
discipline168 that must be inculcated and persistently adopted as a priori 
to thought.169 But it is not a debilitating discipline that requires submis-
sion or strict adherence to orderly rules, and it is not designed to achieve 
a specific result (other than good thinking). To Dewey, the attitude of 
suspended conclusion is a matter of self-regulating the mind to a particu-
lar starting point for thought.170 
The training of the “disciplined mind” is, indeed, important.171 But 
“[w]hen discipline is conceived in intellectual terms (as the habitual 
power of effective mental attack), it is identified with freedom in its true 
sense.”172 It is our negative internal tendencies and external influences 
that are confining, not an adherence to a discipline of suspended conclu-
sion. 
Dewey highlighted the contrast between freedom of thought empo-
wered by an attitude of suspended conclusion and the imprisonment of 
impulse: 
Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in the trained 
power of thought, in ability to “turn things over,” to look at matters 
deliberately . . . . If a man’s actions are not guided by thoughtful 
conclusions, then they are guided by inconsiderate impulse, unbal-
anced appetite, caprice, or the circumstances of the moment. To cul-
tivate unhindered, unreflective external activity is to foster en-
slavement, for it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, sense, 
and circumstance.173 
Our internal tendencies and external influences—the “appetite, sense, 
and circumstance”—must be overcome before genuine thought is able to 
flourish. To accomplish that, self-control, self-restraint, and self-
discipline are required. In that sense, the attitude of suspended conclu-
                                                 
 166. Id. at 13. 
 167. Id. at 14. 
 168. Id. at 20 (discussing importance of a “fundamental and persistent discipline” in matters of 
the necessities of life, including thinking). 
 169. Id. at 66 (“The only way to achieve traits of carefulness, thoroughness, and continuity 
(traits that are, as we have seen, the elements of the ‘logical’) is by exercising these traits from the 
beginning, and by seeing to it that conditions call for their exercise.”). 
 170. Id. at 21 (“Only systematic regulation of the conditions under which observations are 
made and severe discipline of the habits of entertaining suggestions can secure a decision that one 
type of belief is vicious and the other sound.”). 
 171. Id. at 63. 
 172. Id. at 64. 
 173. Id. at 66–67. 
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sion is a discipline but one that should be accepted as healthy because of 
its rewards. 
Consider the discipline a type of marker on the mind, where a re-
minder or alarm is set off as soon as one is presented with a problem—a 
deliberative device for detecting both the approach of the necessity of 
thinking and the hazards that await should one adopt the wrong ap-
proach.174 The intervention of deliberation, or thinking, is necessary prior 
to reaching any conclusion in order to yield an effective result.175 It 
should also be noted that tolerating the seemingly intolerable labor of 
thought not only makes our arguments more effective but also protects 
our decisions from falling prey to the undesirable.176 
Just as our training, experience, and practice can be guided toward 
habits of good thinking, so too can bad thinking habits evolve over time 
and become embedded in our affairs.177 The goal is to learn to adopt the 
good habits and replace the bad ones, especially where bad habits are 
directly competing against the effective adoption of good ones. 
An attitude of suspended conclusion can keep the mind moving to-
ward reasoned judgment and away from impulsive conclusion. The goal 
is to naturalize the attitude, to regularize the skepticism that the attitude 
entails, and, consequently, to equip the mind to start the thinking process 
in a manner that makes reflection more uniform. If one acknowledges the 
utility of the attitude of suspended conclusion and consumes these les-
sons on its importance to thought, then suspended conclusion can be me-
                                                 
 174. Consider Dewey’s thoughts (in a different context) on the utility or monuments and me-
morials as similar devices of remembrance and discipline: 
[L]est we forget; and deliberately institute, in advance of the happening of various con-
tingencies and emergencies of life, devices for detecting their approach and registering 
their nature, for warding off what is unfavorable, or at least protecting ourselves from its 
full impact and for making more secure and extensive what is favorable. All forms of ar-
tificial apparatus are intentional modifications of natural things so designed that they may 
serve better than in their natural estate to indicate the hidden, the absent, and the remote. 
DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 19. Where suspended conclusion may not be triggered naturally, we 
may find utility in its injection into the mind to guide future action. 
 175. Dewey, Logical Method, supra note 37, at 17. 
 176. A passage from Judge Learned Hand is illuminating here. In describing the allure of theo-
ries and philosophies as aided by the perpetual question marks regarding meaning in the Universe, 
Judge Hand stated: 
The relief of finding something which will take the place of the “intolerable labor of 
thought”—with all its attendant sense of futility—makes us the prey of the most obscene 
and monstrous faiths, from which, if thinking were not itself such a perversion of our na-
ture, thinking would protect us. 
Letter from Learned Hand to Bernard Berenson, (Jan. 8, 1950), in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED 
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 582 (1994). See also de Bono, supra note 45, at 774 (discussing 
the issue of practicing prejudice). 
 177. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 22 (warning about developing bad habits and the wrong 
kind of thinking). 
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chanized in one’s thinking affairs. Due to some natural tendencies 
against this thought process, one must first understand how people think, 
after which one can adjust and remove the blinders that come with the 
seeming obviousness or suppressed recognition of suspended conclusion, 
both of which can lead to it being ignored. 
VI. COMPETING HABITS OF MIND: NATURAL TENDENCIES, THE 
SEDUCTIVE DESIRE FOR CLOSURE, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESISTANCE 
TO THE SUSPENDED CONCLUSION CONCEPT 
The necessity of appreciating the suspended conclusion concept is 
amplified by the fact that many individuals develop tendencies against 
the attitude. This Part examines the competing habits that may impede 
the effective adoption of an attitude of suspended conclusion. It looks at 
anecdotal evidence of these habits, along with a selection of various psy-
chological theories and biases that help explain their existence. 
This discussion is not meant to imply that we should peg individu-
als into categories, teach to traits, or isolate individuals for differential 
treatment. Instead, the tendencies are sufficiently recognized by educa-
tors and psychologists as creating problems for some individuals (if not 
many) to justify the universal teaching of the attitude of suspended con-
clusion to law students and lawyers. Universal teaching will catch those 
most vulnerable to these debilitating tendencies while its universal utility 
will be beneficial to all, including those who will be reinforced and re-
minded and those who will be exposed to the attitude for the first time. 
Closing of the mind to self-evaluation of the faults in our own processes 
is partly due to the bias blind spot or the “not me” mentality discussed 
earlier.178 
Understanding—or “unwrapping”—habits and recognizing their 
existence can be a revealing and surprisingly instructive enterprise be-
cause we so often give them only lip service, even when we can already 
identify them generally.179 This is partly because habits of mind are 
tricky things that can evade our attention. Robert Tremmel posited that 
                                                 
 178. See Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 394. 
 179. Green explains the utility of such an enterprise—what he calls “unwrapping the ordinary” 
of habits: 
Habit is unwrapped; the concealed ethic, the ordinary, is revealed. And in this unwrap-
ping, the ordinary may appear as a fresh discovery even though there is nothing in it we 
did not already know. The ordinary unwrapped can surprise us. The medium of our 
thought—these ordinary words—can become the object of our thought, and when that 
happens, then philosophy has entered, not as someone else’s text, but as our own. Philos-
ophy appears as the logic of our common life. 
Green, supra note 15, at 86–87. 
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“[s]ometimes this habit of mind and the problems it causes [are] not so 
easy to see because we are so close to [them].”180 
“Habit of mind” is a term so loosely used that it lacks any specific 
definition and thus should not be seen as a term of art. The term denotes 
habitual, and perhaps unconscious, thinking and reasoning patterns.181 
Poor habits of mind can be debilitating and destructive to good thinking 
and may inhibit progress; overcoming them can free us and allow us to 
advance.182 An attitude of suspended conclusion can be compared to 
what Thomas Kuhn described as a transformation of vision on the part of 
a scientist.183 Kuhn used the example of a contour map, where training 
the eye to focus on a picture that might immediately appear as only lines 
on a page allows the observer to understand it for the significance of the 
lines—as a representation of scientific data, not just random lines.184 The 
attitude of suspended conclusion, too, is a transformative lens for the 
mind’s approach to a problem, and unless it is employed, a person does 
not see the full picture of the problem faced. 
                                                 
 180. Robert Tremmel, A Habit of Mind, 24 ENG. EDUC. 20, 21 (1992). 
 181. A general explanation of its meaning from Gail Jaquish, a psychologist, and James Ware, 
a federal district court judge for the Northern District of California, is instructive: 
Fold your arms across your chest. Look down and notice which arm is on top. Now re-
verse your arms so that the opposite arm is on top. Probably feels odd, right? When in-
structed to fold your arms, without thinking about it, you usually place the same arm on 
top every time. This is a “habit of body.” We all develop these unconscious patterns of 
physical behavior. And, just like our habits of body, we also have “habits of mind,” un-
conscious patterns of thinking and reasoning. For example, if asked to imagine what it 
would be like to be in an operating room, surrounded by surgeons, you are perhaps un-
likely to imagine yourself surrounded by African-American women in white smocks. Al-
though such a situation could occur, a habit of mind might lead you to think of surgeons 
as aging white males. There are numerous examples of habitual thinking patterns we use 
every day. Many habits of mind are behaviorally adaptive, in that they afford us cognitive 
efficiencies in our daily problem-solving activities. 
Gail A. Jaquish & James Ware, Adopting an Educator Habit of Mind: Modifying What It Means to 
“Think Like a Lawyer,” 45 STAN. L. REV. 1713, 1713 (1993). 
 182. See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, PARADIGMS & BARRIERS: HOW HABITS OF MIND GOVERN 
SCIENTIFIC BELIEFS 3 (1993) (arguing that entrenched habits of mind impede progress in science and 
that overcoming debilitating habits of mind is the reason for many scientific advances). 
 183. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111–12 (2d ed. 1970). 
 184. Kuhn observed: 
Looking at a contour map, the student sees lines on paper, the cartographer a picture of a 
terrain. Looking at a bubble-chamber photograph, the student sees confused and broken 
lines, the physicist a record of familiar subnuclear events. Only after a number of such 
transformations of vision does the student become an inhabitant of the scientist’s world, 
seeing what the scientist sees and responding as the scientist does. The world that the stu-
dent then enters is not, however, fixed once and for all by the nature of the environment, 
on the one hand, and of science, on the other. Rather, it is determined jointly by the envi-
ronment and the particular normal-scientific tradition that the student has been trained to 
pursue. 
Id. 
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We are all, according to Dewey, impulsive creatures. Dewey be-
lieved that people have natural tendencies that inhibit the attitude of sus-
pended conclusion.185 Dewey claimed that our tendencies against sus-
pending conclusion are a matter of impulses that must be checked with a 
disciplined attitude against them.186 The attitude of suspended conclusion 
must act as a type of counterhabit against these debilitating tendencies. 
Several observers recognize that there is a tendency among many 
against suspending conclusion, although they posit different theories re-
garding the reasons. Although we need not know where or why the habit 
originates to recognize that it exists, it is instructive to consider some of 
the literature examining the causes. 
A. Anecdotal Evidence 
Peter Martorella has explained that our everyday experience ob-
serving everyday pursuits is revealing—people often tend not to engage 
in the type of reflective thinking that Dewey claimed is essential to good 
thinking.187 People tend to engage in bad mental habits. We live in an 
instant gratification society, and external forces help engender a tendency 
against suspending conclusion.188 In other works outside How We Think, 
Dewey explained that human beings sometimes exhibit tendencies 
against deliberation and in favor of the hunch-like conclusion, with ad-
mittedly varying results.189 
Observers from English composition courses note that students 
generally have problems suspending conclusion—they often tend to act 
                                                 
 185. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 22–24 (discussing Locke and the flaws that inhibit full reason-
ing). 
 186. Id. at 64 (“Direct immediate discharge or expression of an impulsive tendency is fatal to 
thinking. Only when the impulse is to some extent checked and thrown back upon itself does reflec-
tion ensue.”). 
 187. Martorella, supra note 78, at 87–88 (“Some discursive and admittedly superficial repre-
sentative examples from several selected areas of our culture may suggest how and why Americans 
tend to bypass reflective thinking in their everyday pursuits.”). 
 188. Id. at 88–90 (discussing formal education techniques, labor roles, news media, and enter-
tainment as contributing barriers to effective learning processes and demands for instant gratifica-
tion). 
 189. Dewey explained the tendency to act without foresight and the unpredictability of results 
(i.e., sometimes we guess right) as follows: 
Sometimes human beings act with a minimum of foresight, without examination of what 
they are doing and of probable consequences. They act not upon deliberation but from 
routine, instinct, the direct pressure of appetite, or a blind “hunch.” It would be a mistake 
to suppose that such behavior is always inefficient or unsuccessful. When we do not like 
it, we condemn it as capricious, arbitrary, careless, negligent. But in other cases, we 
praise the marvelous rectitude of instinct or intuition; we are inclined to accept the off-
hand appraisal of an expert in preference to elaborately calculated conclusions of a man 
who is ill-informed. 
Dewey, Logical Method, supra note 37, at 17. 
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against it unless taught otherwise to adopt an attitude.190 Authors like 
Eugene Garver and Mina Shaughnessy have noted that the point at which 
we reach closure is the distinctive mark among experienced and effective 
writers—those who adopt an attitude of suspended conclusion and reach 
closure at a later point—and the inexperienced or ineffective ones that 
reach closure quickly because they fail to pause and inject a suspension 
attitude into their process.191 Shaugnessy confirmed that when writing 
about basic writing, educators are regularly left wondering why students 
exhibit tendencies that favor instant closure when faced with a prob-
lem.192 Perhaps it is a matter of the anxiety of the state of doubt; perhaps 
it is something else. According to Shaugnessy, people rush to judgment 
to avoid the pains of deliberation that are required with an attitude of 
suspended conclusion.193 
                                                 
 190. Richard Coe and Kris Gutierrez explained that it is a problem seen in “basic writing” 
courses when students must engage in problem-solving: 
Instructors who use this problem-definition assignment with basic writing students should 
be aware of a particular problem which often characterizes their writing. Typically less 
skilled at planning and overwhelmed by the multitude of decisions they need to make, 
these students tend to clutch onto the more linear, standard textbook approach and to 
concentrate so much attention on lower-level decisions that they can think of little else. 
For this reason, they generally reach closure too quickly: typically they use overly gene-
ralized, inadequately qualified thesis statements and appear to lack what John Dewey 
called that “attitude of suspended conclusion” which characterizes good academic writ-
ing. 
Richard M. Coe & Kris Gutierrez, Using Problem-Solving Procedures and Process Analysis to Help 
Students With Writing Problems, 32 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 262, 267 (1981). Unfortunately, it 
appears to also exist in advanced education and writing, such as we see in the field of legal educa-
tion. 
 191. Eugene Garver, The Arts of the Practical: Variations on a Theme of Prometheus, 14 
CURRICULUM INQUIRY 165, 170 (1984). Garver explained: 
Shaughnessy, who claimed above that bad writers weren’t much good at moving between 
abstract and concrete, says that: “[O]ne of the most notable differences between expe-
rienced and inexperienced writers is the rate at which they reach closure upon a point. 
The experienced writer characteristically reveals a much greater tolerance for what De-
wey called an ‘attitude of suspended conclusion’ than the inexperienced writer.” 
Id. (quoting MINA P. SHAUGHNESSY, ERRORS AND EXPECTATIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE TEACHER OF 
BASIC WRITING 227 (1977)). 
 192. Shaughnessy posed the educator’s perplexity with student behavior in regards to closure 
as follows: 
Should the teacher then turn from problems of error to his students’ difficulties with the 
paragraphs of academic essays, new complexities emerge. Why, he wonders, do they 
reach such instant closure on their ideas, seldom moving into even one subordinate level 
of qualification but either moving on to a new topic sentence or drifting off into reverie 
and anecdote until the point of the essay has been dissolved? Where is that attitude of 
‘suspended conclusion’ that Dewey called thinking, and what can one infer about their in-
tellectual competence from such behavior? 
Mina P. Shaughnessy, Diving In: An Introduction to Basic Writing, 27 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 
234, 237 (1976). 
 193. People sometimes strategize to avoid deliberation: 
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Dewey recognized that the attitude of suspended conclusion must 
face the obstacle that a state of perplexity is disagreeable to many: 
There may, however, be a state of perplexity and also previous ex-
perience out of which suggestions emerge, and yet thinking need 
not be reflective. For the person may not be sufficiently critical 
about the ideas that occur to him. He may jump at a conclusion 
without weighing the grounds on which it rests; he may forego or 
unduly shorten the act of hunting, inquiring; he may take the first 
“answer,” or solution, that comes to him because of mental sloth, 
torpor, impatience to get something settled. One can think reflec-
tively only when one is willing to endure suspense and to undergo 
the trouble of searching.194 
Unfortunately, when one begins with a strong opinion on a matter, 
one is unlikely to maintain one’s attention on habits that are directed to 
avoid instant judgment, even though people will consistently claim they 
have not made a snap judgment based only on initial opinion. De Bono 
discussed the importance of devices “to prevent the instant judgment ha-
bit and to encourage exploration before decision rather than after it.”195 
He warned that while “[m]ost people would of course claim to carry out 
this simplistic procedure, and no doubt they do in doubtful situations,” 
the reality is that “very few people carry out the procedure if they have a 
firm opinion on the matter.”196 
Dewey argued that there is a tendency on the part of many with an 
entrenched “dogmatic habit of mind” to rush toward closure, and that this 
tendency must be overcome if good thinking is to occur: 
To many persons both suspense of judgment and intellectual search 
are disagreeable; they want to get them ended as soon as possible. 
They cultivate an over-positive and dogmatic habit of mind, or feel 
perhaps that a condition of doubt will be regarded as evidence of 
mental inferiority. It is at the point where examination and test enter 
into investigation that the difference between reflective thought and 
bad thinking comes in. To be genuinely thoughtful, we must be 
                                                                                                             
The pains associated with suspended conclusion lead people to avoid deliberation and 
seek a quicker substitute. Obstinacy, blind habit, blind obedience, the literal-minded le-
galisms of the Pharisee, are all strategies for avoiding deliberation, for living in a practic-
al world without in fact acting practically on it. Hence people turn from the Prometheus 
myth, attracted instead to another, competing version of the relation of theory and prac-
tice: they seek, and find, an intellectual picture that encourages a rush to judgment, avoid-
ing the pains of deliberation by providing an intellectual, “scientific,” justification for 
such behavior. 
Garver, supra note 191, at 170. 
 194. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 16. 
 195. de Bono, supra note 45, at 775. 
 196. Id. 
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willing to sustain and protract that state of doubt which is the stimu-
lus to thorough inquiry, so as not to accept an idea or make positive 
assertion of a belief until justifying reasons have been found.197 
Others have similarly observed this “confidence” affliction—a dan-
ger that lies in avoidance of actual thinking based on a false reliance on 
one’s confidence in his or her own intelligence. Consider the following 
from de Bono: 
At the other end of the extreme is the highly skilled, highly intelli-
gent, highly articulate thinker. He makes up his mind instantly on an 
issue and then uses his skill of argument to support the position that 
he has taken up. The sheer brilliance of this supporting effort makes 
it unlikely that the thinker will ever feel the need to change his posi-
tion. And yet at no time has he ever tried to explore the subject. Si-
milarly we put a lot of emphasis on debating skills, with the as-
sumption that if you can prove the other fellow wrong, somehow 
that proves you right. In terms of thinking skills, both these strate-
gies are highly inefficient and indeed dangerously so.198 
Some psychologists have explained this tendency as an “immune sys-
tem” that is particularly strong at repelling potentially intrusive alterna-
tive points of view.199 Thus, the impulse toward conclusion seems capa-
ble of affecting the lazy person, the low-intelligence person, and the 
high-intelligence person alike. 
B. Psychological Studies 
As shown above, many observers generalize the discussion of the 
tendency against an attitude of suspended conclusion. To gain insights on 
thinking and problem-solving skills, we can inform and enhance our un-
derstanding by looking beyond our anecdotal evidence and toward psy-
chology.200 Those of us outside the field of psychology cannot be psy-
chologists, but we can certainly learn from them. Psychology and other 
                                                 
 197. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at 16. 
 198. de Bono, supra note 45, at 775. 
 199. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 392 (discussing “ideological immune systems” that 
contribute to confirmation bias). Lilienfeld et al. explained that this immune system may be particu-
larly strong in the most intelligent. Id. (“Some authors have conjectured that highly intelligent people 
possess especially effective ideological immune systems because they are adept at generating plausi-
ble counterarguments against competing claims, although this possibility has yet to be tested syste-
matically.”) (citations omitted). 
 200. See Robin S. Wellford-Slocum, The Law School Student-Faculty Conference: Towards a 
Transformative Learning Experience, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 255, 257–59 (2004) (“[T]he field of psy-
chology . . . offers insights into how people think, learn, communicate, solve problems, and interact 
with one another . . . . [L]egal scholars have evaluated how cognitive psychology and composition 
theory can inform and enhance legal pedagogy in general and legal writing pedagogy in particular.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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social-science research dovetail with common experience. If nothing 
else, it supports our anecdotal observations that some people exhibit a 
tendency against suspended conclusion. 
Psychology research on “cognitive fallibilities,” a proper characte-
rization for disregarding the suspended conclusion concept, has been 
called “[u]ndeniably, one of the crowning achievements of modern psy-
chological science.”201 Lilienfeld et al. explained, “[T]here is growing 
consensus that such research demonstrates that human thinking is not 
nearly as rational as once commonly believed. Our judgment and deci-
sion making, although often reasonably accurate, are frequently clouded 
by a plethora of biases and heuristics.”202 
In one example of the application of psychology to similar analyses 
of thought, McElroy and Coughlin drew on cognitive dissonance theory 
to conclude that individuals must be educated about their tendencies for 
dissonance and tactics for disagreeing with themselves and their own 
conclusions, and must also be made to realize that discomfort with con-
ducting a strong counteranalysis is “actually a signal that their analytical 
process is strong and capable.”203 In what they termed “heavy cognitive 
lifting,” McElroy and Coughlin pointed to social scientists who ex-
plained that students often have an aversion to thinking about competing 
arguments because of a “[l]ack of interest, motivation, or unwillingness 
to extend sufficient cognitive effort.”204 Discussing lawyers and students 
who are in a situation in which they are charged with the task of persua-
sion (such as an adversarial proceeding), McElroy and Coughlin con-
tended that “beginning law students and lawyers become invested in their 
conclusions to the point of having difficulty making effective counter-
conclusions.”205 McElroy and Coughlin noted that writing may be partic-
                                                 
 201. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 390. 
 202. Id. at 390–91 (citations omitted). See also Rand, supra note 73, at 749 (“The cognitive 
and behavioral science involved is well-established and empirically documented . . . .”). 
 203. McElroy & Coughlin, supra note 4, at 232. They further elaborate on this theory: 
[C]ognitive dissonance theory . . . explains that [w]hen a person with a strong belief is 
challenged by contradictory evidence, he is less likely to discard the belief than to show a 
new fervor about convincing and converting other people to his view. Thus, according to 
one scholar, if the pedagogic goal is to increase dissonance and thereby to increase learn-
ing, it is important that students . . . feel the psychological discomfort created by the in-
consistencies. 
Id. (quoting Julie A. Seaman, Cognitive Dissonance in the Classroom: Rationale and Rationaliza-
tion in the Law of Evidence, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1097, 1112–13 (2006)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 204. Id. at 231 (quoting Nussbaum & Sinatra, supra note 143, at 385). 
 205. Id. They explain further: 
[C]oherence-based reasoning may help to explain why beginning law students and law-
yers become invested in their conclusions to the point of having difficulty making effec-
tive counter-conclusions . . . . [I]n order to make a supportable and defensible decision, a 
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ularly affected with one-sided argument because, unlike oral argument 
and its adversarial setting, students may not see “cues” to consider coun-
terarguments and responses to counterarguments when engaging in the 
exercise of writing, and they may need to generate such cues on their 
own.206 
1. Confirmation and Other Biases 
Another area of psychological study relevant to a tendency against 
suspending conclusion is what is called “confirmation bias.” Confirma-
tion bias is “the tendency to seek out evidence consistent with one’s 
views, and to ignore, dismiss, or selectively reinterpret evidence that 
contradicts them.”207 Given the lawyer’s role as zealous advocate with an 
occupational commitment to a client’s position, the risk of confirmation 
bias seems high—we want to win for our clients; we are required to 
zealously defend their position; and we begin our task searching for the 
ways to win for that predetermined position. “Confirmation bias can lead 
us to draw distorted conclusions regarding evidence that runs counter to 
our views (a process often termed biased assimilation) . . . .”208 The law-
yer, already entrenched on one side, may fail to fully think through alter-
natives because of a strong desire and need to support that position. Li-
lienfeld et al. further described this phenomenon associated with such 
entrenchment, sometimes called “Myside Bias”: 
The protean phenomenon of confirmation bias appears in a host of 
incarnations in the literature. Myside bias refers to the tendency to 
more readily generate arguments for one’s side of an argument and 
to evaluate those arguments as superior to those on the other side. 
[J.S.] Snelson referred to the ‘‘ideological immune system’’ as our 
coordinated system of psychological defenses against evidence that 
contradicts our entrenched views.209 
This bias is particularly disabling because it is self-perpetuating and 
proliferates the further we get along in an inquiry. “Confirmation bias 
predisposes us not merely to interpret evidence in a self-fulfilling man-
                                                                                                             
legal decision-maker will transform “[a]mbiguous, equivocal, and conflicting va-
riables . . . into coherent models . . . .” 
Id. at 231–32 (quoting Simon, A Third View, supra note 152, at 545). 
 206. Id. at 233. 
 207. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 391 (citations omitted). See also Rand, supra note 73, at 
748 (“Overconfidence also leads to a ‘confirmation bias’ that restricts our very ability to seek out 
information that might open our eyes. The confirmation bias is our tendency to seek out evidence 
that will confirm, not challenge, our current view of a situation or frame of a problem.”). 
 208. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 392 (emphasis omitted). 
 209. Id. at 391–92 (citations omitted). 
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ner, but to seek out evidence supporting only one side of a polarized is-
sue.”210 
Similarly, psychologists have recognized another bias called the 
“anchoring heuristic” that is particularly antagonistic to an attitude of 
suspended conclusion.211 Anchoring occurs where individuals fail to 
move beyond an initial position or conclusion.212 These individuals in-
stead anchor themselves to that first position in a manner that forecloses 
the possibility of considering alternative docking points. 
In addition to these biases, several other theories in psychology 
have explored the types of tendencies that hinder an attitude similar to 
that of suspended conclusion. Some of the explanations for why individ-
uals have a tendency to rush to conclusions include both individual dif-
ferences—including individual desire for predictability,213 preference for 
order and structure in one’s affairs,214 discomfort or intolerance with am-
biguity,215 decisiveness, and close-mindedness216—and situational forces, 
including external influences that are disruptive, like time, pressure, 
noise, and fatigue.217 Both categories include influences that drive indi-
viduals to exhibit what some psychologists have termed a need for cogni-
                                                 
 210. Id. at 392. Also consider the following: 
Part of this is the natural and understandable inclination to seek out information that 
would prove a hypothesis—indeed, in numerous studies participants manifested a strong 
tendency to test hypotheses by only looking for confirmatory proof rather than discon-
firming information, even where the solution could only be achieved by more skeptical 
analysis. 
Rand, supra note 73, at 748. 
 211. Rand, supra note 73, at 746 (“The anchoring heuristic causes us to become irrationally 
wedded to an initial starting point and fail to sufficiently adjust from that ‘anchor’ upon subsequent 
consideration.”) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 14 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See, e.g., Sebastien Grenier et al., Intolerance of Uncertainty and Intolerance of Ambigui-
ty: Similarities and Differences, 39 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 593, 594 (2005). 
 214. See, e.g., Donna M. Webster & Arie W. Kruglanski, Individual Differences in Need for 
Cognitive Closure, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1049, 1050 (1994) [hereinafter Webster & 
Kruglanski, Individual Differences]. 
 215. See, e.g., Stanley Budner, Intolerance of Ambiguity as a Personality Variable, 30 J. 
PERSONALITY 29 (1962); Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and 
Perceptual Personality Variable, 18 J. PERSONALITY 108, 120 (1949); Grenier et al., supra note 213, 
at 596. 
 216. Licht, supra note 9, at 668; Webster & Kruglanski, Individual Differences, supra note 
214, at 1049. 
 217. See, e.g., John T. Cacioppo et al., Dispositional Differences in Cognitive Motivation: The 
Life and Times of Individuals Varying in Need for Cognition, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 197, 239 (1996) 
[hereinafter Cacioppo et al., Dispositional Differences]; Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster, 
Motivated Closing of the Mind: “Seizing” and “Freezing,” 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 263, 280 n.1 (1996) 
[hereinafter Kruglanski & Webster, Motivated Closing] (discussing situational influences like time, 
pressure, and noise). 
2011] Thinking Like Thinkers 53 
tive closure,218 a low or high need for cognition,219 or a low or high per-
sonal need for structure.220 Furthermore, there are a number of possibili-
ties for why people experience dissatisfaction if there is no clear answer 
for a problem, exhibit a high intolerance for uncertainty,221 or suffer from 
anxiety that is relieved by closure.222 
2. Need for Cognitive Closure 
One of the more interesting areas related to the attitude of sus-
pended conclusion is known as the need for cognitive closure (NFC),223 
which “refers to individuals’ desire for a firm answer to a question and 
an aversion toward ambiguity.”224 NFC is believed to represent a “di-
mension of individual differences as well as a situationally inducible 
state.”225 Theorists like psychologists Arie Kruglanski and Donna Web-
ster assume that desire for closure varies along a continuum, with indi-
viduals at the NFC end of the continuum showing cognitive impatience 
or impulsivity.226 Strong NFC individuals “may ‘leap’ to judgment on the 
basis of inconclusive evidence and exhibit rigidity of thought and reluc-
tance to entertain views different from their own”227 whereas individuals 
                                                 
 218. See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 753 
n.55 (1999–2000) (“[The] need [for closure] is assumed to inhibit the formulation of alternatives to a 
given hypothesis, as these introduce confusion and hence undermine existing closure.”); Rebecca 
Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. 
REV. 163, 170–71 (2007) (“In a world that consists of astronomical bits of data, humans are ‘cogni-
tive misers’ who save their effortful processing for only a few tasks.”) (citation omitted); Arne Roets 
et al., Determinants of Task Performance and Invested Effort: A Need for Closure by Relative Cog-
nitive Capacity Interaction Analysis, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 779, 780 (2008). 
 219. See, e.g., John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, The Need for Cognition, 42 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 116, 117 (1982); Cacioppo et al., Dispositional Differences, supra 
note 217, at 247. For a discussion of the work of Cacioppo and Petty, see Jennifer L. Lambe, The 
Structure of Censorship Attitudes, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 485, 499 (2008). 
 220. Steven L. Neuberg & Jason T. Newsom, Personal Need for Structure: Individual Differ-
ences in the Desire for Simple Structure, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 125–26 (1993). 
 221. Richard M. Sorrentino et al., Uncertainty Orientation: Implications for Affective and 
Cognitive Views of Achievement Behavior, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 203 (1984); 
Michel J. Dugas et al., Intolerance of Uncertainty and Information Processing: Evidence of Biased 
Recall and Interpretations, 29 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 57, 58 (2005). 
 222. Luca Bensi & Fiorella Giusberti, Trait Anxiety and Reasoning Under Uncertainty, 43 
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 827, 827 (2007); Dugas et al., supra note 221, at 67; 
Marjorie Roth Leon & William Revelle, Effects of Anxiety on Analogical Reasoning: A Test of Three 
Theoretical Models, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1302, 1302 (1985). 
 223. Kruglanski & Webster, Motivated Closing, supra note 217, at 264; see also ARIE W. 
KRUGLANSKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOSED MINDEDNESS (2004). 
 224. Kruglanski & Webster, Motivated Closing, supra note 217, at 264. The analysis of cogni-
tive closure here should not be seen or confused as an endorsement of “cognitive learning theory”—
a recognized term for a learning discipline that has its own independent meaning and approach. 
 225. Id. at 278. 
 226. Webster & Kruglanski, Individual Differences, supra note 214, at 1049. 
 227. Kruglanski & Webster, Motivated Closing, supra note 217, at 264. 
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at the opposite end of the continuum, with a strong need to avoid closure, 
may “savor uncertainty and be reluctant to commit to a definite opi-
nion.”228 Under a heightened NFC, individuals might engage in closure-
promoting activities, like generating fewer competing hypotheses or sup-
pressing attention to information that is inconsistent with their hypothes-
es.229 Alternatively, when individuals are not concerned with closure, 
they might perform thorough and extensive information searches and 
generate many alternative explanations for the facts.230 The need to avoid 
closure may arise “when the judgmental task is intrinsically enjoyable 
and interesting.”231 Moreover, individuals might exhibit personal differ-
ences in the need for closure, arising from “cultural norms or personal 
socialization histories.”232 
Theorists propose that the need for closure instills two general ten-
dencies: “the urgency tendency and the permanence tendency.”233 Under 
the urgency tendency, individuals are inclined “to ‘seize’ on closure 
quickly.”234 The permanence tendency refers to the desire to perpetuate 
closure to “‘freeze’ on[] past knowledge and to safeguard future know-
ledge.”235 When people under a heightened need for closure have a ten-
dency to seize on early information and immediately freeze, they “may 
process less information before committing to a judgment and generate 
fewer competing hypotheses to account for the available data.”236 In gen-
eral, “individuals under a high (vs. low) need for closure . . . consider 
less evidence before forming a judgment.”237 
Ultimately, it is a matter of competing habits—good versus bad. 
Some of our tendencies work against the good. Dewey juxtaposed the 
good habits that can be formed by training the critical thinker with the 
bad habits of the uncritical one: “[H]abits of suspending judgment till 
inferences have been tested by the examination of evidence, [as opposed 
to habits of thinking that] alternat[e] with flippant incredulity, belief or 
unbelief being based, in either case, upon whim, emotion, or accidental 
circumstances.”238 The struggle facing the thinking like thinkers ap-
proach is finding ways in which the good habits prevail. 
                                                 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 265 (citation omitted). 
 233. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 268. 
 238. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 66. 
2011] Thinking Like Thinkers 55 
VII. OVERCOMING HABITS AND THE CONCEPT OF DEBIASING 
If we understand the tendencies against suspended conclusion, we 
can attempt to combat them. The first step is to understand the process of 
suspended conclusion and its utility to the thinking exercise. The second 
step is to recognize the tendency against it. And the third step is interven-
tion—by oneself or through the assistance of the education process—to 
combat the debilitating tendencies and biases against its effective adop-
tion. Part III largely set forth the case for education on disciplined 
thought and justified it as an important goal for the learning enterprise 
inside and outside of the classroom. Educators should increase attention 
on the attitude of suspended conclusion in legal education, and lawyers 
should constantly self-reflect on the use of the attitude in their practice.239 
Part III also demonstrated the possibilities inherent in that learning 
process. Learning is difficult enough, however, even when there are not 
biases competing against it. As Part VI explained, substantial biases and 
bad habits exist that impede effective adoption of an attitude of sus-
pended conclusion. This Part examines the literature on whether these 
biases and habits can be overcome. 
As explained in Part III, Dewey was quite confident in the ability of 
education to fight the antisuspension tendencies.240 Research from psy-
chology also reinforces the idea that certain cognitive biases can be over-
come. A few representative studies will be discussed in this part. The 
literature is far more extensive than the examples provided here, but 
these studies generally reflect the discussion of debiasing mechanisms 
today. 
Substantial research has been conducted regarding “debiasing me-
thods, [meaning] not only techniques that eliminate biases but also those 
that diminish their intensity or frequency.”241 Although the success of 
debiasing techniques is the subject of much debate in the psychology 
literature, there is evidence of some rather substantial positive ad-
vances.242 Again, this Article’s proposal is not meant to encourage in-
struction on what to think.243 
                                                 
 239. See, e.g., Neumann, Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 132, at 747 n.67 (bemoaning the 
paucity of “any significant material on the architecture of a proof of a conclusion of law” in law 
school texts); Rand, supra note 73, at 733 (“[W]hat most clinical programs under-emphasize is the 
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 240. See supra Part III. 
 241. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 391. 
 242. When examining the literature on debiasing techniques against confirmation bias, one is 
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In particular, debiasing against confirmation bias has seen some 
success, as documented in the psychology literature. For example, Lilien-
feld et al. explained that several studies have “found that ‘consider-the-
opposite’ or ‘consider-an-alternative’ strategies can be at least somewhat 
effective in combating confirmation bias and related biases.”244 Although 
the research is not clear how well debiasing techniques can apply in all 
situations, Lilienfeld et al. concluded, “In some but not all studies, basic 
education about specific cognitive biases (e.g., brief and nontechnical 
tutorials on confirmation bias) also decreases participants’ tendency to 
fall prey to certain errors, including confirmation bias.”245 
Lilienfeld et al. cautioned, “Nevertheless, the question of whether 
instruction alone is sufficient to disabuse people of confirmation bias and 
related errors is controversial.”246 They described the state of the litera-
ture—from the harshest critics of such debiasing to, in contrast, “others 
[who] believe that psychoeducational programs may often be effica-
cious.”247 One example provided was the work of a psychologist who 
“argued that although critical-thinking programs are, at best, modestly 
effective, the most successful methods teach participants ‘metacognitive 
rules,’ such as reminding them to consider alternative points of view in 
pertinent situations.”248 Such reminders are precisely what are advocated 
in and accomplished by this Article. 
Most observers believe that humans are not hardwired with immut-
able cognitive fallibilities. These faults can be overcome. For example, 
when reviewing the research in psychology, Licht noted, “The need for 
                                                                                                             
among differing debiasing techniques, and the decidedly mixed research evidence concerning their 
efficacy. Still, there have been a few promising advances. Id. at 393 (citation omitted). 
 243. Id. (“[T]he goal of debiasing techniques should be to help people grasp and appreciate 
alternative points of view, not necessarily to accept them as equally valid or moral.”). 
 244. Id. (citations omitted). Lilienfeld et al. proceeded to describe some of the studies: 
Using these approaches, researchers instruct participants to generate rival points of view 
or imagine counterfactual outcomes for a set of events. In many respects, all of the 
aforementioned techniques bear similarities to Sternberg’s program to inculcate wisdom 
in children by helping them understand and appreciate others’ points of view and to Ba-
ron’s goal of teaching ‘‘active open-mindedness’’; that is, the capacity to thoughtfully 
consider arguments on multiple sides of an issue. 
 
Still other researchers have found that delayed decision making decreases confirmation 
bias among clinicians asked to make diagnostic judgments. Encouraging practitioners to 
slow down and reflect on their decisions may permit them to consider and evaluate alter-
native viewpoints. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 245. Id. (citations omitted). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. (citing Daniel T. Willingham, Critical Thinking: Why Is It So Hard To Teach?, 31 AM. 
EDUCATOR 8–19 (2007)). 
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cognitive closure is primarily motivational. That is, ‘need’ denotes a mo-
tivational tendency or proclivity rather than a tissue deficit.”249 Thus, the 
tendency to seek closure prematurely is capable of alteration once it is 
recognized. Others, like Gregory Mitchell, have explained that there is 
evidence that teaching open-mindedness can allow individuals to “tran-
scend” the debilitating tendencies and biases against suspended conclu-
sion.250 
Whether or how these debiasing mechanisms can work in law, ac-
cording to Mitchell, are questions that need further research, but “[t]he 
balance of evidence that exists strongly suggests that a disposition to en-
gage in more effortful and open-minded thinking is associated with the 
commission of fewer errors on tests of rational thinking.”251 Mitchell 
contended, “[T]o the extent that critical thinking dispositions may be 
learned, teaching law students to engage in actively open-minded think-
ing may be an important goal of law schools.”252 
Confirmation bias in lawyers and debiasing countermeasures have 
been discussed elsewhere in legal literature, especially regarding prose-
cutors and postconviction reviews.253 For example, Keith Findley and 
Michael Scott proposed that prosecutors adopt “[a] host of interlocking 
measures [that] can reduce the distorting effects of tunnel vision, even if 
they cannot eliminate it altogether.”254 They claimed that the first step to 
                                                 
 249. Licht, supra note 9, at 668. 
 250. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded 
for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 146–47 (2002). Mitchell 
summarized: 
People who score higher on cognitive disposition measures such as Stanovich and West’s 
actively open-minded thinking scale and Petty and Cacioppo’s need for cognition scale 
appear to be better “in tune” with their cognitions, recognize the value of objective data 
processing, and allocate processing resources accordingly. Consequently, these individu-
als may transcend their personal theories about a given topic and monitor their thought 
processes carefully. The result is relatively objective reasoning. 
Id. (citation omitted). Mitchell recognizes, however, that further work remains to develop debiasing 
techniques that assist in accomplishing these results. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. (citation omitted). 
 253. See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias] (“Prosecutorial 
tunnel vision can be viewed as the culmination of confirmation bias and selective information 
processing . . . .”); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision 
in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 396 (2006) (“Cognitive distortions such as confirmation 
bias, hindsight bias, outcome bias, and a host of other psychological phenomena make some degree 
of tunnel vision inevitable. Institutional pressures on police, prosecutors, defense lawyers and courts 
amplify those natural tendencies.”); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polari-
zation: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) (discussing confirmation bias); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: 
Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004). 
 254. Findley & Scott, supra note 253, at 396. 
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overcoming the bias is to admit it exists. Recognition of the existence of 
the cognitive bias can temper its manifestation.255 They then proposed a 
number of “measures [that] can then be taken to overcome tunnel vi-
sion,” including “[e]ducation and training.”256 
Alafair Burke offered some suggestions to mitigate confirmation 
biases in prosecutors as well. First, she explained, “Some empirical evi-
dence suggests that education can potentially mitigate bias, [but] cogni-
tive bias is stubborn, [so] education is an unlikely panacea.”257 She also 
reported that “[s]ocial scientists have found that both induced counterar-
gument and exposure to opposing views can reverse the effects of cogni-
tive bias.”258 Furthermore, when people are forced to “switch sides”259 
and are required to discover and argue the case against their preferred 
“side,”260 effective mitigation of cognitive bias occurs. The technique of 
rebutting your own case was also proposed as an effective debiasing me-
chanism by Richard Birke.261 
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 261. Richard Birke, Settlement Psychology: When Decision-Making Processes Fail, 18 
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in both discovery and case processing, concluding that putting one in the shoes of the opponent is an 
effective way to avoid confirmation bias—a technique that could fairly be called a technique for 
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Id. at 214–15. 
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Some believe cognitive biases can be controlled by teaching stu-
dents based on case studies in which cognitive biases, tendencies, or er-
rors had deleterious effects.262 Others, like Mitchell, explain that instruc-
tion to consider opposing arguments has also proven effective at debias-
ing. “The research showing positive effects of open-mindedness accords 
with research into perhaps the most successful debiasing mechanism: 
encouraging subjects to consider opposing arguments or alternative solu-
tions to problems.”263 
With that realistic, optimist conclusion about the need and ability to 
ameliorate the negative effects of disregarding the suspended conclusion 
concept, this Article may be in line with what Lilienfeld et al. called the 
“meliorists”: 
[N]amely those who believe that human thinking often departs from 
rational standards and that such departures may be rectifiable by in-
tervention efforts. At the same time, we acknowledge that the ulti-
mate success of these efforts remains to be seen. Indeed, it is possi-
ble that given the formidable barriers against debiasing we have 
outlined, even the most efficacious of intervention efforts may meet 
with only partial success.264 
Even if the success is unknown, it is prudent for lawyers to acknowledge 
the utility of the attitude of suspended conclusion, recognize the tenden-
cies against it, and at least try to adjust their thinking accordingly. 
Conscious adherence to an attitude of suspended conclusion can in-
dependently improve thinking. If the thinker recognizes it, has a desire to 
do it, and uses willpower, one can personally remove the biases without 
the need for further intervention. Mitchell concluded, “[I]t appears that 
individuals disposed to examine both sides of an issue and consider new 
arguments ‘self-debias.’”265 As Paul Brest and Linda Krieger contended, 
one can learn to avoid confirmation bias by reflecting on experience.266 
This Article does not endorse any particular debiasing techniques or 
fully evaluate the current research. It is enough to understand that some 
evidence exists that such techniques have successfully been used. At the 
very least, if we recognize the existence of the biases against suspended 
conclusion, then we can begin to give attention to the need for further 
research and other efforts to learn how these debilitating biases can be 
                                                 
 262. See, e.g., Rand, supra note 73, at 749 (arguing for using case studies to teach cognitive 
bias in legal decision-making). 
 263. Mitchell, supra note 250, at 144. 
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811, 826 (1999) (arguing that avoiding confirmation bias can be learned from experience). 
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overcome and therefore how our thinking can be improved.267 “Given the 
positive effects that an active, open mind may have on rational behavior, 
further research into the development and maintenance of this disposition 
would seem particularly important.”268 In the meantime, examining and 
recognizing the importance of the attitude of suspended conclusion, as 
well as the need to replace bad tendencies against the attitude with good 
tendencies that reinforce adherence to the attitude, improves the chances 
that individuals will engage in effective thinking. 
The power of recognizing the attitude of suspended conclusion 
seems to be, in part, what Dewey intended with his work. Dewey be-
lieved that the tendency to rush to judgment is nearly inevitable if not 
regulated.269 At the very least, the internal and external influences on the 
mind that create a tendency against suspending conclusion demonstrate, 
according to Dewey, the necessity of understanding when bad thinking 
habits occur in order to lessen their occurrences and engrain the attitude 
to increase the probability that good thinking will prevail: 
But the process of reaching the absent from the present is peculiarly 
exposed to error; it is liable to be influenced by almost any number 
of unseen and unconsidered causes—past experience, received 
dogmas, the stirring of self-interest, the arousing of passion, sheer 
mental laziness, a social environment steeped in biased traditions or 
animated by false expectations, and so on . . . . The very inevitable-
ness of the jump, the leap, to something unknown, only emphasizes 
the necessity of attention to the conditions under which it occurs so 
that the danger of a false step may be lessened and the probability 
of a right landing increased.270 
There is enough evidence of the resistance to the attitude of suspended 
conclusion when it is not cultivated to warrant attempts to increase the 
probability that students and other thinkers can and will overcome the 
strong tendencies working against it. 
A negative habit of mind can be a barrier to good thinking, while a 
positive one can free the mind to conduct thorough and reasoned analy-
                                                 
 267. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 395. Lilienfeld et al. called for increased attention and 
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sis. The recognition of the tendencies against suspended conclusion 
should motivate thinkers of all types to take steps to internalize the posi-
tive habit of mind associated with the suspended conclusion concept. To 
the extent that educators can assist in that process, it should be consi-
dered a primary goal. To the extent that lawyers can begin to recognize 
the value of the suspended conclusion concept and adopt it as an attitude 
when approaching their affairs, there will be a greater likelihood of rea-
lizing its benefits and a better chance that lawyers will think like think-
ers. 
VIII. CAN LAWYERS THINK LIKE THINKERS? 
Whether the law is susceptible and adaptable to the thinking like 
thinkers concept is an open question because of the general tendencies 
and biases previously identified, as well as the unique nature of both ad-
vocacy and the adversarial process inherent in much of the lawyering 
task. There is also a question of whether the architecture of the American 
legal system is constructed to accommodate lawyers suspending conclu-
sion. This Part introduces some of the difficulties uniquely applicable to 
lawyers and ultimately concludes that adopting an attitude of suspended 
conclusion in the practice of law is still advisable. 
Parts of the suspended conclusion concept have been institutiona-
lized in areas of the American legal system. Some lawyers are forced to 
adopt an attitude of suspended conclusion by nature of their position and 
attendant ethical duties. For example, it is imperative that some members 
of the legal system exercise an attitude of suspended conclusion—they 
are duty bound to do so as neutral arbiters in disputes between competing 
conclusions. Being subject to cognitive fallibilities themselves, there is 
of course the risk that they will not be so disciplined. Nonetheless, the 
law embeds that requirement in judges and jurors and charges them to be 
neutral arbiters and open-minded deliberators. Evidentiary rules, as well 
as the realities of the process, of course, may limit the information avail-
able for evaluation. But, at the very least, judges and jurors are required 
to suspend conclusion until the completion of a trial. 
Prosecutors, too, have the suspended conclusion concept partially 
embedded in the definition of their role. For example, a prosecutor is 
generally under a duty to weigh evidence to a greater degree than the 
typical litigator, exercise power and discretion in a controlled manner, 
refrain from prosecuting unless the evidence provides confidence in the 
guilt of a defendant, and share or reveal evidence to the opposition, in-
cluding evidence that may tend to be exculpatory and therefore contrary 
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to the prosecutor’s interests.271 Again, these requirements are not a full 
embrace of the suspended conclusion concept, and there is the possibility 
that tendencies and biases may impede their actual adoption at times. 
This Article does not attempt to examine patterns of adherence to these 
duties or otherwise enter the vast debates on prosecutorial conduct. In-
stead, it is at least useful to see the codification of some of the suspended 
conclusion principles in the ethical codes. 
Some areas of law require the same type of adherence to suspended 
conclusion from certain other institutional actors. For example, adminis-
trative agencies are required to give reasons for their actions and consid-
er alternatives under a variety of statutory commands.272 The Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA)273 requires that an agency adequately consider 
the information available to it before making a decision, and it will inva-
lidate an agency action as arbitrary and capricious if the agency had a 
“predetermined conclusion” or operated with a “closed mind” when 
making its decision.274 The requirements exist to ensure that agency deci-
sions are meaningful.275 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
is another good example.276 At its heart, NEPA’s environmental impact 
review requires that a federal agency adequately consider viable alterna-
tives to its action.277 The consideration of alternatives is designed to en-
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tives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the 
reasons for their having been eliminated. (b) Devote substantial treatment to each alterna-
tive considered in detail including the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate 
their comparative merits. (c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of 
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sure that an agency reaches an “informed decision,”278 and the failure to 
evaluate alternatives to action, including the alternative of “no action,” 
can make an agency’s decision invalid. 
This Article does not examine the effectiveness of these suspended-
conclusion-like commands to institutional actors or determine whether 
they actually facilitate the attitude in practice. Again, these commands 
demonstrate that certain places at least attempt to institutionalize this 
general suspended conclusion concept into parts of the legal system and 
require the lawyers involved therein to engage in some form of the dis-
cipline. 
The very nature of a lawyer’s professional obligations serves as a 
unique impediment to a successful adoption and application of the atti-
tude of suspended conclusion. Most lawyers start in a position precom-
mitted to a client and therefore precommitted to a conclusion. Lawyers as 
fiduciaries must act in the best interests of their client279 and are ethically 
bound to zealously advocate on behalf of the client’s position.280 Law-
yers as advocates become concerned with making the best case and, as 
zealous advocates, become invested in one conclusion.281 The majority of 
lawyers’ roles are not designed to achieve the “best” conclusion at all. In 
fact, because a lawyer is typically committed to the client’s position, in 
most situations the lawyer will be unable to choose an alternative. Law-
yers are self-interested and invested in their starting positions. Lawyers 
do not generally have the luxury of truly objective inquiry. But that does 
not mean that they should not seek to appreciate and understand the al-
ternatives and the utility of operating under suspended conclusion. 
                                                                                                             
the lead agency. (d) Include the alternative of no action. (e) Identify the agency’s pre-
ferred alternative or alternatives, if one or more exists, in the draft statement and identify 
such alternative in the final statement unless another law prohibits the expression of such 
a preference. (f) Include appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the pro-
posed action or alternatives. 
Id. 
 278. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1989) 
(explaining that NEPA’s alternatives provisions seek to prohibit “uninformed” agency action). Also 
consider: 
Allowing the public to submit comments to an agency that has already made its decision 
is no different from prohibiting comments altogether. Indeed, if the public perceives that 
the agency will disregard its comments, there may be a chilling effect that causes the pub-
lic to refrain from submitting comments as an initial matter. 
Nehemiah Corp. v. Jackson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 830, 847 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
 279. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000). 
 280. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007) (“A lawyer must also act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf.”). 
 281. See, e.g., Rand, supra note 73, at 749 (“[A] lawyer committed to proving her client’s case 
would be inclined to prioritize opposition document review that hunts for ‘smoking guns’ rather than 
probe for weaknesses in her own case.”). 
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Lawyers are particularly prone to the closure tendencies discussed 
in Part VI,282 and because they must “prove the client’s case,” lawyers 
are particularly susceptible to confirmation bias. As previously ex-
plained, “Confirmation bias is perhaps the best known and most widely 
accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on hu-
man reasoning.”283 A host of applications of confirmation bias theories 
abound in the literature of law and lawyering. Lawyers with a zeal to win 
and already entrenched in one side are more likely to be confident in 
their case largely because they have little room to deviate away from it. 
The lawyer is more likely to seize and freeze into the conclusion that 
“wins” the client’s case. 
One of the obstacles to overcome is the reality that “many individu-
als may be unreceptive to debiasing efforts because they do not perceive 
these efforts as relevant to their personal welfare.”284 Lilienfeld et al. ex-
plained, “[S]ome debiasing efforts may succeed only if participants can 
be persuaded that their biases result in poor decisions of real-world con-
sequence to them.”285 Thus, it is fundamental that we convince lawyers 
and law students of the benefits of adopting an attitude of suspended 
conclusion, open their eyes to the possibility of cognitive errors, and per-
suade them to challenge themselves to think like thinkers. An appeal to 
the instrumental benefits of adopting an attitude of suspended conclusion 
may be the only way to convince lawyers that the attitude can somehow 
be harmonized with these seemingly inconsistent “winning” goals. 
No doubt it is difficult for many lawyers and law students to over-
come the habits against suspending conclusion. In part, lawyers must be 
reminded that seldom is an outcome clear in a legal dispute, and as such, 
there is almost always a rival proposition to ponder. McElroy and 
Coughlin have concluded, “[T]he vast majority of [law] students have 
been educated in environments where there is a right and wrong an-
swer . . . . [They] may tend automatically to return to the mindset that 
there must be a ‘correct’ response to the legal question presented.”286 But 
a student’s chief concern when approaching problems should not be get-
                                                 
 282. See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 218, at 175 (“Research on lawyer personality 
suggests that lawyers generally tend to score high on personality measures that correlate with a de-
sire for ‘structure, schedules, closure on decisions, planning, follow through, and a “cut-to-the-
chase” approach.’”) (citation omitted). 
 283. Nickerson, supra note 260, at 175 (quoting JONATHAN ST. B.T. EVANS, BIAS IN HUMAN 
REASONING: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 41 (1989)). Nickerson describes confirmation bias as a 
ubiquitous psychological phenomenon that causes “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways 
that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.” Id. 
 284. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 79, at 394. 
 285. Id. 
 286. McElroy & Coughlin, supra note 4, at 233. 
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ting the “right” answer.287 Lawyers and law students must remember 
what Edward Levi counseled: “In an important sense legal rules are nev-
er clear, and, if a rule had to be clear before it could be imposed, society 
would be impossible.”288 The lawyer must also recognize that seldom is 
an argument bulletproof. There is almost always an opposing side and 
some risk of losing a case to a contrary argument. 
This Article has already provided support for the proposition that 
one can improve one’s own arguments by starting from suspended con-
clusion and understanding all rival propositions and conclusions.289 Good 
lawyering requires operating under some form of suspended conclusion, 
even when one is constrained to work on behalf of a client’s position, 
because advocacy is improved by questioning its foundations from all 
opposing sides.290 Lawyers must be able to anticipate opposing argu-
ments and be able to present effective responses. Thus, adopting sus-
pended conclusion can allow lawyers to “moot” themselves and their 
client’s arguments. If a lawyer discovers the strength of the opposition 
arguments as they would most zealously be presented, a better response 
can be prepared. Or the lawyer can better counsel the client on the 
strength of the case and can honestly assess possible options and changes 
in position (such as settlement or not filing). 
In fact, under the “best interest” requirement, lawyers arguably 
must initially adopt an attitude of suspended conclusion when evaluating 
and preparing a case in order to satisfy their ethical duties to diligently 
and effectively represent their clients. Adopting an attitude of suspended 
conclusion can, indeed, make individual attorneys better thinkers and 
consequently better lawyers—which is “best” for the client as well. An 
attitude of suspended conclusion can lead to a heightened capability for 
thought and a capacity to make better arguments and achieve beneficial 
outcomes in a variety of lawyering settings. Lawyers should aspire to 
inculcate it as a discipline in their thought processes, despite the limita-
tions. Lawyers may not be free to choose a different conclusion, but that 
should not relieve them from the thinker’s obligation to utilize the sus-
pended conclusion process. 
I am optimistic that this thinking like thinkers, suspended conclu-
sion concept can coincide with legal practice. This Article should also 
spark a number of questions for further thought and research: When we 
                                                 
 287. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 49–50 (discussing the risks of starting from the position of find-
ing a “right” answer). 
 288. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949). 
 289. See supra Part VI. 
 290. See Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 253, at 524 (“Applied to lawyers, the 
practice of counterargument not only serves as a debiasing strategy, but also amounts to the good 
lawyering skill of acting as one’s own Devil’s Advocate.”). 
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teach or engage in advocacy, are we embedding an attitude against sus-
pended conclusion or entrenching the lawyer into a belief of the superior-
ity of locked positions? Does a lawyer have an ethical responsibility to 
consider alternative arguments in counseling clients? Does a prosecutor 
have a different ethical responsibility to suspend conclusion than defense 
counsel or civil litigators? Does the Socratic Method demand a quick, 
on-the-feet conclusion rather than encourage the suspension of conclu-
sion? Do our teaching techniques and case-study method inculcate a be-
lief that there is one right decision? Does a reliance on precedent dimi-
nish or enhance the suspended conclusion concept? Does streamlined 
litigation or expedited review hinder our ability to suspend conclusion? 
Does the determination of probable success in preliminary injunctions 
interfere with the ability to suspend conclusion on permanent injunc-
tions? Does law school education actually encourage impulsive deci-
sions? Is the adversarial system itself too game-oriented to leave room 
for universal adoption of suspended conclusion in the American system? 
These and many more questions are provoked by this Article, and I en-
courage discussion in that regard. 
For now, however, we can focus on recognition and understanding 
of the concept independent and divorced from some of these concerns. 
We can acknowledge the fact that the lawyer can move from confusion 
to a greater sense of clarity in thinking but only if starting with the hum-
ble recognition of the realities discussed in this Article and the utility of 
approaching problems with suspended conclusion. By occupational dis-
position, there are obstacles to using the attitude of suspended conclusion 
in everyday lawyering. Thus, vigilance in understanding and adhering to 
a discipline is all the more important. 
Finally, and at the very least, suspended conclusion approaches 
should be taught in law school, when the aspiring lawyer is not yet te-
thered by clients and should have the opportunity to embrace the sus-
pended conclusion and realize its effects. Teaching suspended conclusion 
will help develop the best methods for understanding the law as a whole 
and the full array of argumentation law students will face in practice. 
Whether a self-interested lawyer or law student, one should adopt an atti-
tude of suspended conclusion for instrumental reasons; if nothing else, it 
will result in better analysis. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Dewey wrote that “[t]he method that is employed in discovery, in 
reflective inquiry, cannot possibly be identified with the method that 
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emerges after the discovery is made.”291 The attitude of suspended con-
clusion must be acquired and employed if effective thought is to flourish. 
“In the genuine operation of inference, the mind is in the attitude of 
search, of hunting, of projection, of trying this and that; when the con-
clusion is reached, the search is at an end.”292 Only when conclusion is 
suspended is there space for the exploration and search. 
Aspiring thinkers should read the original, classic works like De-
wey’s How We Think, not just commentary or analysis (like this Article) 
about them.293 I hope that this Article will inspire readers to read (or re-
read) How We Think, in its entirety, along with other related works from 
the rich and diverse interdisciplinary research on thinking, and to form 
their own opinions from the original material. Until then, feel free to sus-
pend conclusion on the merits of this exposition. 
In the end, this Article’s goals have been to awaken our discipline 
and advance an art of adopting and implementing an attitude of sus-
pended conclusion and to recognize the importance of its practice by 
making explicit the tendency against it.294 The failure to adopt the atti-
tude of suspended conclusion can have far-reaching implications that 
should not be overlooked.295 We should not presume something is ob-
                                                 
 291. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 112. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Maurice Moffatt and Stephen Rich provided the following advice: 
The wise educator does not necessarily limit his reading to the newest books—but he 
does make sure that these are among the sources to which he goes for aid. Many older 
ones contain a wealth of valuable guides and directly useful information for the educator. 
 
The alert educator, for example, will not be content with recent books interpreting John 
Dewey’s ideas. In order to cancel out what the interpreters themselves have added, and, 
thus, use Dewey’s contributions with the slant of his own personality and approach, the 
educator cannot avoid reading carefully, if for the third or tenth time, Democracy and 
Education or How We Think, the two most influential of Dewey’s works. 
Maurice P. Moffatt & Stephen G. Rich, The Educator’s Professional Reading, 29 J. EDUC. SOC. 69, 
71 (1955). 
 294. As Professor Thomas Green opined in an article generally praising Dewey’s How We 
Think, we should embrace the unwrapping of what seems ordinary to find the lessons that hide be-
neath: 
To unwrap the ordinary requires a certain naiveté, a capacity to simply take notice of 
what we know already, but persist in overlooking. To do so is to attain a difficult and 
hard-won kind of naiveté, a kind of simplicity in which the simplest matters near at hand 
are neither overlooked nor in need of justification. Taking note of the ordinary is to phi-
losophy what parsimony is to science, a principal mark of its elegance. 
Green, supra note 15, at 103. See also ICHHEISER, supra note 4, at 8 (“[T]he social scientist should 
never be more satisfied with his achievements and more proud of his insight than when he succeeds 
in perceiving, in making explicit, and in incorporating into his theory of social reality certain ob-
vious but perhaps for that very reason overlooked significant facts.”). 
 295. ICHHEISER, supra note 4, at 10 (“Psychologists and sociologists sometimes neglect ob-
vious facts because they fail to realize their far-reaching implications.”). 
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served—in a vacuum or in practice—simply on the basis that it is ob-
vious.296 That lesson should apply when one examines the utility of ob-
serving the attitude of suspended conclusion and the merits of the con-
cept. It should not be taken for granted that individuals recognize and 
honor these seemingly obvious lessons.297 “The fact . . . that something is 
obvious need not mean that it is explicitly noticed, registered, and scien-
tifically taken into account. Instead, something of the opposite is true. 
Obvious facts tend to remain invisible.”298 If we can overcome our confi-
dence and seriously question our approaches to thinking, we can see the 
utility in examining the suspended conclusion concept and begin to adopt 
it in our own thinking affairs. 
  
                                                 
 296. Id. at 7–8 (“The psychology . . . of personality [is] vitiated by . . . the tendency to neglect, 
or even to ignore, certain very important facts and problems because those facts and problems appear 
to be quite obvious.”). To quote the indefatigable Sherlock Holmes, “The world is full of obvious 
things which nobody by any chance ever observes.” 1 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Hound of 
the Baskervilles, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 52, at 571, 592. 
 297. ALDOUS HUXLEY, THEMES AND VARIATIONS 69 (Harper & Row 1970) (1950) (“Most 
human beings have an almost infinite capacity for taking things for granted.”). 
 298. ICHHEISER, supra note 4, at 8; see also Green, supra note 15, at 85 (“Philosophy starts 
when we seek to unearth the principle buried in the ordinary, when we seek to reveal the practice 
already present in the affairs of daily life.”). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
UNRELATED PORTIONS OF HOW WE THINK THAT ARE DEVOTED TO  
SUBJECTS OTHER THAN THE ATTITUDE OF SUSPENDED CONCLUSION 
How We Think is divided into three parts and sixteen chapters.299 
This Article concurs in part and abstains in part with the opinions and 
analyses in How We Think. Just as in the analysis of a concurring opinion 
from the Supreme Court, it is necessary to diagram this Article vis-à-vis 
the book. This appendix differentiates the points of agreement and en-
gagement with Dewey’s work conducted in this Article from the points 
of abstention or where this Article expresses no opinion on certain theo-
ries in How We Think. 
Part I300 of How We Think is titled “The Problem of Training 
Thought.” The core material relevant to this Article is contained in Chap-
ters I, II, and V—titled, respectively, “What is Thought?”; “The Need for 
Training Thought”; and “The Means and End of Mental Training: The 
Psychological and the Logical.” Chapter III, “Natural Resources in the 
Training of Thought,” and Chapter IV, “School Conditions and the 
Training of Thought,” discuss individual capacities and environmental 
conditions for learning that are beyond the subject matter of this Ar-
ticle.301 Chapters III and IV focus on theories of learning, which are dis-
claimed and excluded from this Article. 
Part II302 of How We Think is titled “Logical Considerations.” With-
in it, Chapter VI, “The Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought,” and 
Chapter VIII, “Judgment: The Interpretation of Facts,” are relevant to the 
limited extent where they do, in fact, help illuminate or expand on the 
fundamentals of the suspended conclusion concept.303 Not relevant in 
Part II is Chapter VII, “Systematic Inference: Induction and Deduction,” 
as it is a chapter discussing methods of analysis that are outside the scope 
of this Article’s discussion.304 The other remaining chapters of Part II—
Chapters IX–XI (titled, respectively, “Meaning: Or Conceptions and Un-
derstanding,” “Concrete and Abstract Thinking,” and “Empirical and 
Scientific Thinking”)—relate to learning processes and are not relevant 
to this Article’s discussion.305 
                                                 
 299. DEWEY, supra note 1, at v–vi. 
 300. Id. at 1–67. 
 301. Id. at 29–55. 
 302. Id. at 68–156. 
 303. Id. at 68–78, 101–15. 
 304. Id. at 79–100. 
 305. Id. at 116–56. 
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Part III306 of How We Think is titled “The Training of Thought” and 
is wholly unrelated to this Article, as Dewey further delved into learning 
methods and processes and thus more controversial ground.307 Part III is 
concerned with learning and teaching theories that are not a matter of 
concern here. It holds Chapters XII–XVI, which are titled “Activity and 
the Training of Thought,” “Language and the Training of Thought,” 
“Observation and Information in the Training of Mind,” “The Recitation 
and the Training of Thought,” and “Some General Conclusions,” respec-
tively. These chapter titles are self-explanatory; they cover subjects upon 
which this Article will express no opinion. 
The 1933 edition follows the same general organization. It is di-
vided into three parts with identical titles to the original but subdivides 
the parts into nineteen chapters.308 The same exclusions from this Ar-
ticle’s scope discussed above apply equally to the corresponding sections 
in the 1933 edition. The next appendix further discusses the differences 
between the 1910 and 1933 editions. 
                                                 
 306. Id. at 157–224. 
 307. See, e.g., Bugg, supra note 108, at 528 (describing the differences between the three parts 
in How We Think); Max Eastman, Review, 8 J. PHIL., PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 244, 244 (1911) 
(differentiating his criticism of Parts II and III from Part I, which “is the presentation and definition 
of the problem of training thought”). 
 308. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at vii–x. 
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APPENDIX B 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 1910 AND 1933 EDITIONS 
OF HOW WE THINK 
Among some Dewey scholars, there is a debate over whether 
changes in the text of How We Think between its original publication in 
1910 and the revised publication in 1933 should be read as marking a 
change in Dewey’s thoughts, influences, or ideology.309 This “continui-
ty” debate, however, focuses on those sections of How We Think that 
discuss learning or teaching processes, methods, and skills. As those sec-
tions are beyond the scope of this Article, that debate, while interesting, 
is irrelevant to the issues herein discussed. Thus, even if there were some 
changes, they are not of consequence here. 
Many claim that there was no substantial change in the texts at 
all,310 even if there is evidence of a change in Dewey’s general philoso-
phies during the lag between editions. And most at least agree that there 
was essentially no change in the substance and conclusions in portions of 
the text discussing the suspended conclusion concept—even if some 
changes in the latter parts of the book may have some consequence to 
                                                 
 309. The debate is essentially between Richard Prawat, who argues that differences in the 1910 
and 1933 versions of How We Think provide evidence of discontinuity in Dewey’s thought, and 
others who argue that there is no such evidence from the comparison of editions. George Stanic and 
Dee Russell, rejecting Prawat’s claims, summarized the main points in the continuity debate as fol-
lows: 
Prawat claims that a major discontinuity appeared in John Dewey’s thinking in 1915, 
when Dewey moved away from the thinking of William James to that of Charles Peirce. 
The change is described as a “dramatic” and “stunning about face” in Dewey’s views. 
We look at one crucial part of Prawat’s evidence of discontinuity, the 1910 and 1933 ver-
sions of How We Think. Prawat cites passages from the 1933 version to make his case for 
discontinuity[, but] we conclude that Prawat’s hypothesis of discontinuity cannot be sus-
tained. 
George M.A. Stanic & Dee Russell, Continuity in How We Think, 104 TCHRS. C. REC. 1229 (2002) 
(citations omitted). To fully understand the debate on the continuity of Dewey’s philosophy using 
the two editions of How We Think as the point of reference for a purported change, it is best to read 
the principal articles and responses in sequence. See Richard S. Prawat, Dewey, Peirce, and the 
Learning Paradox, 36 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 47 (1999); Richard S. Prawat, The Two Faces of Deweyan 
Pragmatism: Inductionism Versus Social Constructivism, 102 TCHRS. C. REC. 805 (2000); Richard 
S. Prawat, Dewey and Peirce, the Philosopher’s Philosopher, 103 TCHRS. C. REC. 667 (2001); 
James Garrison, Dewey and Eros: A Response to Prawat, 103 TCHRS. C. REC. 722 (2001); Richard 
S. Prawat, Evidence for the Dewey Discontinuity Hypothesis: A Rejoinder to Garrison, 104 TCHRS. 
C. REC. 867 (2002); Stanic & Russell, supra; Richard S. Prawat, The Debate Continues: Further 
Evidence of Discontinuity in Dewey’s Philosophy, 105 TCHRS. C. REC. 893 (2003). 
 310. See, e.g., Bode, supra note 1, at 210 (basics of 1910 edition retained in 1933 revision); 
Sven Nilson, Book Review, 44 PHIL. REV. 75, 75 (1935) (finding the primary character of the origi-
nal substance was retained in the 1933 edition). 
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Dewey’s other theories.311 So even if one takes a side on the debate over 
whether the 1933 edition is evidence of a shift in Dewey’s larger philos-
ophies, the side chosen is immaterial for purposes of this Article and 
one’s analysis of its subject. 
The characterization by reviewers that there was essentially no 
change is a bit of an overstatement. After comparing the 1910 and 1933 
edition, I agree that the principal subjects, conclusions, and theories—
particularly in Part I—were unchanged in the 1933 edition. Nonetheless, 
the 1933 edition was, as Dewey claimed in the Preface,312 a true “res-
tatement” as the title indicates and was not simply a second edition. It 
was a “revision” in the order of an “extensive rewriting.”313 The phrase-
ology and terminology were changed rather extensively in parts, even 
when the general sentiments did not. Part I, where most of the material 
relevant to this Article appears, underwent, according to Dewey, changes 
in “matters of phrasing, where a multitude of minor alterations have been 
made in the interests of greater sureness of comprehension.”314 Conse-
quently, this Article sometimes quotes the 1933 edition where its alterna-
tive language explaining the suspended conclusion concept is instructive. 
Dewey stated in the Preface that changes in the “development of major 
ideas” are “most numerous and complete in Part II.”315 None of those 
changes are relevant to this Article. The “evident” changes or new ma-
terial in Part III of the 1933 edition that Dewey explained in its Preface 
are also not of consequence to this Article, nor are the additions of “illu-
strative material” or the “rearrangement of the position of [some] entire 
chapters.”316 Again, I leave aside whether any such changes reflect a 
change in Dewey’s broader philosophies. Finally, as to the entire book, 
                                                 
 311. Eugene Bugg’s review of the 1933 edition explained that Part I, where the suspended 
conclusion concept is concentrated in the book, was largely untouched in the revision: 
The present book retains the basic ideas set forth in the first edition . . . . Part I, which is 
devoted to the problem of training thought, remains essentially unchanged. The most ex-
tensive revisions occur in Part II, which aims to give a theoretical account of the opera-
tions of the mental processes as they actually take place in the acquisition of knowledge, 
in contrast to the older formalistic conceptions. Part III, which deals with the practical 
problem of training thought, has received a somewhat fuller treatment than in the former 
edition, although no changes of fundamental importance occur in this section. 
Bugg, supra note 108, at 528; see also Nilson, supra note 310, at 75–76 (criticizing Dewey’s expe-
riential learning approach but explaining that “most of the changes occur in the second” and third 
parts); DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at iii–iv (preface characterizing the differences between editions 
and highlighting Parts II and III as being the most significantly changed while Part I was largely just 
alternative language for clarified comprehension purposes). 
 312. DEWEY 1933, supra note 1, at iii. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
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Dewey wrote in the Preface to the 1933 edition that “the basic ideas, 
those that gave the original work its distinctive character, have not only 
been retained but have also been enriched and developed further.”317 
Thus, the reader of this Article should not infer any intended mean-
ing or implication from the choice of citation to the 1910 or 1933 article 
in the remaining portions of this Article. In relation to this Article’s the-
sis and the areas of Dewey’s thought covered herein, the 1910 and 1933 
editions complement each other. 
 
                                                 
 317. Id. 
